Timeline of World History TIMELINE OF WORLD HISTORY



1800 - 1899
1800-09 1810-19 1820-29 1830-39 1840-49 1850-59 1860-69 1870-79 1880-89 1890-99
1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890
1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891
1802 1812 1822 1832 1842 1852 1862 1872 1882 1892
1803 1813 1823 1833 1843 1853 1863 1873 1883 1893
1804 1814 1824 1834 1844 1854 1864 1874 1884 1894
1805 1815 1825 1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895
1806 1816 1826 1836 1846 1856 1866 1876 1886 1896
1807 1817 1827 1837 1847 1857 1867 1877 1887 1897
1808 1818 1828 1838 1848 1858 1868 1878 1888 1898
1809 1819 1829 1839 1849 1859 1869 1879 1889 1899
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FitzGerald Edward
1810 - 1819
History at a Glance
1810 Part I
Marie Louise, Duchess of Parma
Edict of Fontainebleau
First Republic of Venezuela
Mexican War of Independence
Argentine War of Independence
Colombian Declaration of Independence
Foolish Fatherland
Chilean War of Independence
Bolivian war of independence
Charles XIV John
Invasion of Guadeloupe
Cavour Camillo
1810 Part II
Cumberland Presbyterian Church
Montalembert Charles
Musset Alfred
Scott: "The Lady of the Lake"
Goya: "The Disasters of War"
The Nazarenes
Beethoven: "Egmont"
Chopin Frederic
Chopin - Nocturne Op.9 No.2
Frederic Chopin
Nicolai Otto
Nicolai - The Merry Wives of Windsor - Overture
Otto Nicolai
Rossini: "La Cambiale di Matrimonio"
Schumann Robert
Schumann - Piano sonata n.1 op.11
Robert Schumann
Spurzheim Johann Gaspar
Hahnemann Samuel
Girard Philippe
Humboldt University of Berlin
Krupp Friedrich Carl
Barnum Phineas Taylor
1811 Part I
George IV
Battle of the Danube
Massacre of the Mamelukes at Cairo
Napoleon Francois-Joseph Charles
Battle of Fuentes de Onoro
Paraguay independent of Spain
Venezuelan War of Independence
Peruvian War of Independence
San Martin Jose
Battle of Las Piedras
Artigas Jose Gervagio
Invasion of Java
Battle of Tippecanoe
1811 Part II
Bottiger Karl August
Niebuhr Barthold Georg
University of Oslo
Jane Austen: "Sense and Sensibility"
Stowe Harriet Beecher
Friedrich de la Motte-Fouque: "Undine"
Gautier Theophile
Goethe: "Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit"
Gutzkow Karl
Thackeray William Makepeace
Dupre Jules
Jules Dupre
Ingres: "Jupiter and Thetis"
Thomas Lawrence: Portrait of Benjamin West
Thorvaldsen: "Procession of Alexander the Great"
1811 Part III
Liszt Franz
Franz Liszt - Liebestraum - Love Dream
Franz Liszt
Prague Conservatoire
Carl Maria von Weber: "Abu Hassan"
Avogadro Amedeo
Great Comet of 1811
Bunsen Robert
Poisson Simeon-Denis
Manning Thomas
Berblinger Albrecht Ludwig
1812 Part I
French invasion of Russia
Battle of Borodino
Kutuzov Mikhail
Malet Claude-François
Perceval Spencer
1812 Part II
War of 1812
Battle of Salamanca
Siege of Burgos
Battle of Tordesillas
Hegel: "Science of Logic"
Jewish emancipation
Browning Robert
Robert Browning 
"Dramatic Romances"
"The Pied Piper of Hamelin"
The Brothers Grimm: "Fairy Tales"
Lord Byron: "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage"
Dickens Charles
Charles Dickens
"Great Expectations"
Theatre Royal Drury Lane
Goncharov Ivan Aleksandrovich
Smiles Samuel
Krasinski Zygmunt
Kraszewski Joseph Ignatius
1812 Part III
Elgin Marbles
Rousseau Theodore
Theodore Rousseau
Pforr Franz
Franz Pforr
Beethoven: Symphonies No. 7 (Op. 92)
Encounter between Beethoven and Goethe at Teplitz
Beethoven: Symphonies No. 8 (Op. 93)
Flotow Friedrich
Friedrich von Flotow: Piano Concerto No. 2
Friedrich von Flotow
Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, Vienna
Burckhardt Johann Ludwig
Krupp Alfred
Red River Settlement, Manitoba, Canada
Hampden Clubs
1813 Part I
German Campaign 1813–1814
Battle of Dresden
Battle of Lutzen
Battle of the Katzbach
Battle of Leipzig
Battle of York
Battle of Fort George
Capture of USS Chesapeake
Battle of Crysler's Farm
Capture of Fort Niagara
Battle of Buffalo
Battle of Vitoria
Siege of San Sebastian
First Serbian Uprising
1813 Part II
Herbart Johann Friedrich
Kierkegaard Soren
Schopenhauer: "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason"
Colby College, Maine
The Baptist Union of Great Britain
Jane Austen: "Pride and Prejudice"
Buchner Georg
Byron: "The Giaour"
Hebbel Friedrich
Ludwig Otto
Shelley: "Queen Mab"
Turner: "Frosty Morning"
London Philharmonic Society
Rossini: "L'ltaliana in Algeri"
Verdi Giuseppe
Anna Netrebko "Final Scene" La traviata
Giuseppe Verdi
Wagner Richard
Richard Wagner - Ride Of The Valkyries
Richard Wagner
Campbell John
Blaxland Gregory
Across the Blue Mountains
Lord Thomas
1814 Part I
1814 campaign in France
Six Days Campaign
Battle of Champaubert
Battle of Montmirail
Battle of Chateau-Thierry
Battle of Vauchamps
Battle of Orthez
Treaty of Chaumont
Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube
Battle of Paris
Battle of Toulouse
Treaty of Fontainebleau
Treaty of Paris
Congress of Vienna
Napoleon's exile to Elba
1814 Part II
Christian VIII
Bakunin Mikhail
Battle of Chippawa
Burning of Washington
Battle of Plattsburgh
Treaty of Ghent
Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814–16
First Anglican bishop in Calcutta
Motley John Lothrop
1814 Part III
Jane Austen: "Mansfield Park"
Byron: "The Corsair"
Edmund Kean's Shylock
Lermontov Mikhail
Mikhail Lermontov
"Death of the Poet"
"The Demon
Walter Scott: "Waverley"
Williav Wordsworth: "The Excursion"
Adelbert von Chamisso: "Peter Schlemihl"
Goya: "The Second of May 1808"
Goya: "The Third of May 1808"
Ingres: "Grande Odalisque"
Millet Jean Francois
Jean Francois Millet
Orfila Mathieu Joseph Bonaventure
Industrial printing presses
Lord's Cricket Ground
1815 Part I
Battle of New Orleans
Hundred Days
Neapolitan War
Battle of Waterloo
Napoleon's surrender
Second Peace of Paris
Ney Michel
1815 Part II
Corn Law
Bismarck Otto
Spanish Invasion of New Granada in 1815–1816
Basel Mission
Beranger Pierre
Byron: "Hebrew Melodies"
Geibel Emanuel
Hoffmann: "Die Elixiere des Teufels"
Scott: "Guy Mannering"
Trollope Anthony
Anthony Trollope 
"Barchester Towers"
Wordsworth: "White Doe of Rylstone"
1815 Part III
Goya: "La Tauromaquia"
Menzel Adolf
Adolf Menzel
Turner: "Crossing the Brook"
Franz Robert
Robert Franz - Oh Wert thou in the Cauld Blast
Robert Franz
Kjerulf Halfdan
Halfdan Kjerulf - Spring Song
Halfdan Kjerulf
Robert Volkmann - Cello Concerto in A minor
Robert Volkmann
Davy lamp
Fresnel Augustin-Jean
Prout William
Prout's hypothesis
Steam battery "Demologos", or "Fulton"
Nations in Arms
Nations in Arms
Apothecaries Act
McAdam John Loudon
Robertson Allan
Eruption of Sumbawa Volcano
1816 Part I
Maria I, Queen of Portugal
John VI of Portugal
Argentine War of Independence
Argentine Declaration of Independence
Federal Convention
American Bible Society
Gobineau Joseph Arthur
Karamzin Nikolai
1816 Part II
Jane Austen: "Emma"
Bronte Charlotte
Charlotte Bronte
"Jane Eyre"
Byron: "The Siege of Corinth"
Freytag Gustav
Derzhavin Gavrila
Leigh Hunt: "The Story of Rimini"
Shelley: "Alastor"
Goya: "The Duke of Osuna"
Rossini: "Barbiere di Siviglia"
Spohr: "Faust"
Brewster David
Laennec Rene-Theophile-Hyacinthe
Siemens Werner
Cobbett William
Froebel Friedrich
1817 Part I
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act
Wartburg Festival
Second Serbian Uprising (1815-1817)
Third Anglo-Maratha War 1817-1818
Bockh August
Hegel: "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences"
Llorente Juan Antonio
Mommsen Theodor
David Ricardo: "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation"
Byron: "Manfred"
Thomas Moore: "Lalla Rookh"
Storm Theodor
Thoreau Henry David
1817 Part II
Constable: "Flatford Mill"
Daubigny Charles
Charles Daubigny
Thorvaldsen: Ganymede Waters Zeus as an Eagle
Leech John
John Leech
Watts George Frederic
George Frederic Watts
Rossini: "La Gazza ladra"
Rossini: "Cenerentola"
Ritter Carl
Long Stephen Harriman
"Blackwood's Magazine"
"The Scotsman"
Waterloo Bridge
1818 Part I
Chilean Declaration of Independence
Bavarian constitution proclaimed
Treaty of 1818
Dobrovsky Josef
Froude James Anthony
Marx Karl
Karl Marx
"Manifesto of the Communist Party"
- Marxism
Friedrich Engels
First International
1818 Part II
Byron: "Don Juan"
Keats: "Endymion"
Peacock: "Nightmare Abbey"
Walter Scott: "Heart of Midlothian"
Shelley Mary
Mary Shelley "Frankenstein"
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley 
"Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus"
Turgenev Ivan
1818 Part III
Burckhardt Jakob
Fohr Carl Philipp
Karl Philipp Fohr
Donizetti: "Enrico, Conte di Borgogna"
Gounod Charles
Gounod - Ave Maria
Charles Gounod
"Stille Nacht, heilige Nacht"
Rossini: "Mose in Egitto"
Bessel Friedrich Wilhelm
Encke Johann Franz
Oxley John
British Admiralty Expeditions
Scoresby William
Phipps Constantine Henry
Buchan David
Parry William Edward
Ross James Clark
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George
Raiffeisen Friedrich Wilhelm
1819 Part I
Founding of modern Singapore
Queen Victoria
Victorian Era
Peterloo Massacre
Albert, Prince Consort
Jakob Grimm: "German Grammar"
Hermes Georg
Schopenhauer: "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung"
Sismondi Jean
Wilson Horace Hayman
1819 Part II
Byron: "Mazeppa"
Eliot George
George Eliot 
"Silas Marner"
Fontane Theodor
Howe Julia Ward
Keats: "Hyperion"
Keller Gottfried
Kotzebue August
Lowell James Russell
Shelley: "The Cenci"
Whitman Walt
Walt Whitman
"Leaves of Grass"
Washington Irving: "Rip van Winkle"
1819 Part III
Courbet Gustave
Gustave Courbet
Theodore Gericault: "The Raft of the Medusa"
Ruskin John
Thorvaldsen: "Lion of Lucerne"
Turner: "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage"
Museo del Prado
Chasseriau Theodore
Theodore Chasseriau
Offenbach Jacques
Offenbach - Barcarole
Jacques Offenbach
Schumann Clara
Mitscherlich Eilhard
Oersted Hans Christian
Central Asia Exploration
Moorcroft William
First Sightings of the Antarctic Continent
Bransfield Edward
Weddell James
Bellingshausen Thaddeus
Burlington Arcade, Piccadilly, London

U.S. frigate United States capturing the British frigate Macedonian, Oct. 25, 1812.
YEAR BY YEAR:  1800 - 1899
1812 Part II
War of 1812

War of 1812, (June 18, 1812–Feb. 17, 1815), conflict fought between the United States and Great Britain over British violations of U.S. maritime rights. It ended with the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Ghent.


U.S. frigate United States capturing the British frigate Macedonian, Oct. 25, 1812.
Colour lithograph by Currier & Ives.
Major causes of the war
The tensions that caused the War of 1812 arose from the French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815). During this nearly constant conflict between France and Britain, American interests were injured by each of the two countries’ endeavours to block the United States from trading with the other.

American shipping initially prospered from trade with the French and Spanish empires, although the British countered the U.S. claim that “free ships make free goods” with the belated enforcement of the so-called Rule of 1756 (trade not permitted in peacetime would not be allowed in wartime). The Royal Navy did enforce the act from 1793 to 1794, especially in the Caribbean Sea, before the signing of the Jay Treaty (Nov. 19, 1794).

Under the primary terms of the treaty, American maritime commerce was given trading privileges in England and the British East Indies, Britain agreed to evacuate forts still held in the Northwest Territory by June 1, 1796, and the Mississippi River was declared freely open to both countries. Although the treaty was ratified by both countries, it was highly unpopular in the United States and was one of the rallying points used by the pro-French Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, in wresting power from the pro-British Federalists, led by George Washington and John Adams.

After Jefferson became president in 1801, relations with Britain slowly deteriorated, and systematic enforcement of the Rule of 1756 resumed after 1805. Compounding this troubling development, the decisive British naval victory at the Battle of Trafalgar (Oct. 21, 1805) and efforts by the British to blockade French ports prompted the French emperor, Napoleon, to cut off Britain from European and American trade. The Berlin Decree (Nov. 21, 1806) established Napoleon’s Continental System, which impinged on U.S. neutral rights by designating ships that visited British ports as enemy vessels.

The British responded with Orders in Council (Nov. 11, 1807) that required neutral ships to obtain licenses at English ports before trading with France or French colonies. In turn, France announced the Milan Decree (Dec. 17, 1807), which strengthened the Berlin Decree by authorizing the capture of any neutral vessel that had submitted to search by the British.

Consequently, American ships that obeyed Britain faced capture by the French in European ports, and if they complied with Napoleon’s Continental System, they could fall prey to the Royal Navy.

The Royal Navy’s use of impressment to keep its ships fully crewed also provoked Americans. The British accosted American merchant ships to seize alleged Royal Navy deserters, carrying off thousands of U.S. citizens into the British navy. In 1807 the frigate H.M.S. Leopard fired on the U.S. Navy frigate Chesapeake and seized four sailors, three of them U.S. citizens.

London eventually apologized for this incident, but it came close to causing war at the time.
Jefferson, however, chose to exert economic pressure against Britain and France by pushing Congress in December 1807 to pass the Embargo Act, which forbade all export shipping from U.S. ports and most imports from Britain.

  The Embargo Act hurt Americans more than the British or French, however, causing many Americans to defy it. Just before Jefferson left office in 1809, Congress replaced the Embargo Act with the Non-Intercourse Act, which exclusively forbade trade with Great Britain and France. This measure also proved ineffective, and it was replaced by Macon’s Bill No. 2 (May 1, 1810) that resumed trade with all nations but stipulated that if either Britain or France dropped commercial restrictions, the United States would revive nonintercourse against the other. In August, Napoleon insinuated that he would exempt American shipping from the Berlin and Milan decrees. Although the British demonstrated that French restrictions continued, U.S. Pres. James Madison reinstated nonintercourse against Britain in November 1810, thereby moving one step closer to war.

Britain’s refusal to yield on neutral rights derived from more than the emergency of the European war. British manufacturing and shipping interests demanded that the Royal Navy promote and sustain British trade against Yankee competitors. The policy born of that attitude convinced many Americans that they were being consigned to a de facto colonial status. Britons, on the other hand, denounced American actions that effectively made the United States a participant in Napoleon’s Continental System.

Events on the U.S. northwestern frontier fostered additional friction. Indian fears over American encroachment coincidentally became conspicuous as Anglo-American tensions grew. Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa (The Prophet) attracted followers arising from this discontent and attempted to form an Indian confederation to counteract American expansion. Although Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock, the British commander of Upper Canada (modern Ontario), had orders to avoid worsening American frontier problems, American settlers blamed British intrigue for heightened tensions with Indians in the Northwest Territory. As war loomed, Brock sought to augment his meagre regular and Canadian militia forces with Indian allies, which was enough to confirm the worst fears of American settlers. Brock’s efforts were aided in the fall of 1811, when Indiana territorial governor William Henry Harrison fought the Battle of Tippecanoe and destroyed the Indian settlement at Prophet’s Town (near modern Battle Ground, Ind.). Harrison’s foray convinced most Indians in the Northwest Territory that their only hope of stemming further encroachments by American settlers lay with the British. American settlers, in turn, believed that Britain’s removal from Canada would end their Indian problems. Meanwhile, Canadians suspected that American expansionists were using Indian unrest as an excuse for a war of conquest.

Under increasing pressure, Madison summoned the U.S. Congress into session in November 1811. Pro-war western and southern Republicans (War Hawks) assumed a vocal role, especially after Kentucky War Hawk Henry Clay was elected speaker of the House of Representatives. Madison sent a war message to the U.S. Congress on June 1, 1812, and signed the declaration of war on June 18, 1812.

The vote seriously divided the House (79–49) and was gravely close in the Senate (19–13). Because seafaring New Englanders opposed the war, while westerners and southerners supported it, Federalists accused war advocates of expansionism under the ruse of protecting American maritime rights. Expansionism, however, was not as much a motive as was the desire to defend American honour.


Artist’s re-creation of the death of Shawnee Chief Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames, Oct. 5, 1813, lithograph 1833.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

The United States attacked Canada because it was British, but no widespread aspiration existed to incorporate the region. The prospect of taking East and West Florida from Spain encouraged southern support for the war, but southerners, like westerners, were sensitive about the United States’s reputation in the world. Furthermore, British commercial restrictions hurt American farmers by barring their produce from Europe. Regions seemingly removed from maritime concerns held a material interest in protecting neutral shipping. “Free trade and sailors’ rights” was not an empty phrase for those Americans.

The onset of war both surprised and chagrined the British government, especially because it was preoccupied with the fight against France. In addition, political changes in Britain had already moved the government to assume a conciliatory posture toward the United States. Prime Minister Spencer Perceval’s assassination on May 11, 1812, brought to power a more moderate Tory government under Lord Liverpool. British West Indies planters had been complaining for years about the interdiction of U.S. trade, and their growing influence, along with a deepening recession in Great Britain, convinced the Liverpool ministry that the Orders in Council were averse to British interests. On June 16, two days before the United States declared war, the Orders were suspended.

Some have viewed the timing of this concession as a lost opportunity for peace because slow transatlantic communication meant a month’s delay in delivering the news to Washington. Yet, because Britain’s impressment policy remained in place and frontier Indian wars continued, in all likelihood the repeal of the Orders alone would not have prevented war.


G. Thompson’s wood engraving of “The Burning of the City of Washington” during the War of 1812. At about 8 pm on the evening of Aug. 24, 1814, British troops under the command of Gen. Robert Ross marched into Washington, D.C., after routing hastily assembled American forces at Bladensburg, Md., earlier in the day. Encountering neither resistance nor any U.S. government officials—President Madison and his cabinet had fled to safety—the British quickly torched government buildings, including the Capitol and the Executive Mansion (now known as the White House).

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Neither the British in Canada nor the United States were prepared for war. Americans were inordinately optimistic in 1812. William Eustis, the U.S. secretary of war, stated, “We can take the Canadas without soldiers, we have only to send officers into the province and the people…will rally round our standard.” Henry Clay said that “the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.” And Thomas Jefferson famously wrote

The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us experience for the attack of Halifax the next, and the final expulsion of England from the American continent.

The British government, preoccupied with the European conflict, saw American hostilities as a bothersome distraction, resulting in a paucity of resources in men, supplies, and naval presence until late in the event. As the British in Canada conducted operations under the shadow of scarcity, their only consolation was an American military malaise. Michigan territorial governor William Hull led U.S. forces into Canada from Detroit, but Isaac Brock and Tecumseh’s warriors chased Hull back across the border and frightened him into surrendering Detroit on Aug. 16, 1812, without firing a shot—behaviour that Americans and even Brock’s officers found disgraceful. The Northwest subsequently fell prey to Indian raids and British incursions led by Maj. Gen. Henry Procter. Hull’s replacement, William Henry Harrison, could barely defend a few scattered outposts. On the northeastern border, U.S. Brig. Gen. Henry Dearborn could not attack Montreal because of uncooperative New England militias. U.S. forces under Stephen van Rensselaer crossed the Niagara River to attack Queenston on Oct. 13, 1812, but ultimately were defeated by a stiff British defense organized by Brock, who was killed during the fight. U.S. Gen. Alexander Smyth’s subsequent invasion attempts on the Niagara were abortive fiascoes.

In 1813, Madison replaced Dearborn with Maj. Gens. James Wilkinson and Wade Hampton, an awkward arrangement made worse by a complicated invasion plan against Montreal. The generals refused to coordinate their efforts, and neither came close to Montreal. To the west, however, American Oliver Hazard Perry’s Lake Erie squadron won a great victory off Put-in-Bay on Sept. 10, 1813, against Capt. Robert Barclay. The battle opened the way for Harrison to retake Detroit and defeat Procter’s British and Indian forces at the Battle of the Thames (Oct. 5). Tecumseh was killed during the battle, shattering his confederation and the Anglo-Indian alliance.

  Indian anger continued elsewhere, however, especially in the southeast where the Creek War erupted in 1813 between Creek Indian nativists (known as Red Sticks) and U.S. forces. The war also took an ugly turn late in the year, when U.S. forces evacuating the Niagara Peninsula razed the Canadian village of Newark, prompting the British commander, Gordon Drummond, to retaliate along the New York frontier, leaving communities such as Buffalo in smoldering ruins.
Early in the war, the small U.S. navy boosted sagging American morale as officers such as Isaac Hull, Stephen Decatur, and William Bainbridge commanded heavy frigates in impressive single-ship actions. The British Admiralty responded by instructing captains to avoid individual contests with Americans, and within a year the Royal Navy had blockaded important American ports, bottling up U.S. frigates. British Adm. George Cockburn also conducted raids on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. In 1814, Britain extended its blockade from New England to Georgia, and forces under John Sherbrooke occupied parts of Maine.

By 1814, capable American officers, such as Jacob Brown, Winfield Scott, and Andrew Jackson, had replaced ineffective veterans from the American Revolution. On March 27, 1814, Jackson defeated the Red Stick Creeks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend in Alabama, ending the Creek War. That spring, after Brown crossed the Niagara River and took Fort Erie, Brig. Gen. Phineas Riall advanced to challenge the American invasion, but American regulars commanded by Scott repulsed him at the Battle of Chippewa (July 5, 1814). In turn, Brown retreated when Commodore Isaac Chauncey’s Lake Ontario squadron failed to rendezvous with the army, and during this retrograde the war’s costliest engagement occurred at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane (July 25). Riall, reinforced by Drummond, fought the Americans to a bloody stalemate in which each side suffered more than 800 casualties before Brown’s army withdrew to Fort Erie.

In 1814, Napoleon’s defeat allowed sizable British forces to come to America. That summer, veterans under Canadian governor-general George Prevost marched south along the shores of Lake Champlain into New York, but they returned to Canada after Thomas Macdonough defeated a British squadron under Capt. George Downie at the Battle of Plattsburgh Bay (see Plattsburgh), N.Y. (Sept. 11, 1814). British raids in Chesapeake Bay directed by Adm. Alexander Cochrane were more successful. British Gen. Robert Ross captured Washington (August 24) and burned government buildings, including the United States Capitol and the Executive Mansion (now known as the White House). The British justified this action as retaliation for the American destruction of York (modern Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada, the previous year. T


Battle of Plattsburgh Bay, Sept. 11, 1814, in which a British squadron under George Downie was turned back by American forces led by Thomas Macdonough.
he British assault on Baltimore (September 12–14) foundered when Americans fended off an attack at Northpoint and withstood the naval bombardment of Fort McHenry, an action that inspired Francis Scott Key’s “Star-Spangled Banner.” Ross was killed at Baltimore, and the British left Chesapeake Bay to plan an offensive against New Orleans.

Meanwhile, New England Federalists, angry about the war’s effect on commerce, gathered at Hartford, Conn., to propose ways of redressing their grievances. Convening from Dec. 15, 1814 to Jan. 5, 1815, the Hartford Convention adopted moderate resolutions, but its mere existence prompted other parts of the country to question New England’s patriotism and Federalist loyalty, spelling eventual doom to the party.

An American cartoon attacking the alliance between the “Humane British” and the Indians during the War of 1812.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Final stages of the war and the aftermath
Immediately after the war started, the tsar of Russia offered to mediate. London refused, but early British efforts for an armistice revealed a willingness to negotiate so that Britain could turn its full attention to Napoleon. Talks began at Ghent (in modern Belgium) in August 1814, but, with France defeated, the British stalled while waiting for news of a decisive victory in America. Most Britons were angry that the United States had become an unwitting ally of Napoleon, but even that sentiment was half-hearted among a people who had been at war in Europe for more than 20 years. Consequently, after learning of Plattsburgh and Baltimore and upon the advice of the Duke of Wellington, commander of the British army at the Battle of Waterloo, the British government moved to make peace.

Americans abandoned demands about ending impressment (the end of the European war meant its cessation anyway), and the British dropped attempts
  to change the Canadian boundary and establish an Indian barrier state in the Northwest.

The commissioners signed a treaty on Dec. 24, 1814.
Based on the status quo antebellum (the situation before the war), the Treaty of Ghent did not resolve the issues that had caused the war, but at that point Britain was too weary to win it, and the U.S. government deemed not losing it a tolerable substitute for victory.

Nevertheless, many Americans became convinced that they had won the contest. Unaware of the treaty, British forces under Edward Pakenham assaulted New Orleans on Jan. 8, 1815, and were soundly defeated by Andrew Jackson’s ragtag army, an event that contributed to the notion of a U.S. triumph.

The unanimous ratification by the U.S. Senate of the Treaty of Ghent and the celebrations that followed cloaked the fact that the United States had achieved none of its objectives.

Cartoon showing Pres. James Madison fleeing from Washington, D.C., which is being burned by the British, during the War of 1812.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Contention in the United States had hobbled the war effort, and domestic disaffection had menaced the Union, but after the war a surge of patriotism inspired Americans to pursue national goals. Contrary to American expectations, Canada remained British and eventually developed its own national identity, partly from pride over repulsing U.S. invasions.

Meanwhile, Britain’s influence among the northwestern Indians was forever ended, and American expansion in that region proceeded unchecked. In the South, the Creek War opened a large part of that region for settlement and led to the events that persuaded Spain to cede Florida to the United States in 1821.

Cartoon from 1812 showing Columbia (the United States) warning Napoleon I that she will deal with him after teaching John Bull (England) a lesson.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

The most enduring international consequence of the war was in the arbitration clauses of Ghent, perhaps the treaty’s most important feature. Its arrangements to settle outstanding disagreements established methods that could adapt to changing U.S. administrations, British ministries, and world events. There lay the seeds of an Anglo-American comity that would weather future disagreements to sustain the longest unfortified border in the world.

David S. Heidler
Jeanne T. Heidler

Encyclopædia Britannica

Battle of Salamanca

The Battle of Salamanca saw an Anglo-Portuguese army under the Duke of Wellington defeat Marshal Auguste Marmont's French forces among the hills around Arapiles, south of Salamanca, Spain on 22 July 1812 during the Peninsular War. A Spanish division was also present but took no part in the battle.

The battle involved a succession of flanking manoeuvres in oblique order, initiated by the British heavy cavalry brigade and Pakenham's 3rd division, and continued by the cavalry and the 4th, 5th and 6th divisions. These attacks resulted in a rout of the French left wing. Both Marmont and his deputy commander, General Bonet, received shrapnel wounds in the first few minutes of firing. Confusion amongst the French command may have been decisive in creating an opportunity, which Wellington successfully seized and exploited.

General Bertrand Clausel, third in seniority, assumed command and ordered a counterattack by the French reserve toward the depleted Allied centre. The move proved partly successful but with Wellington having sent his reinforcements to the centre, the Anglo-Portuguese forces prevailed.

Allied losses numbered 3,129 British and 2,038 Portuguese dead or wounded. The Spanish troops took no part in the battle as they were positioned to block French escape routes and as such suffered just six casualties. The French suffered about 13,000 dead, wounded and captured. As a consequence of Wellington's victory, his army was able to advance to and liberate Madrid for two months, before retreating to Portugal. The French were forced to abandon Andalusia permanently while the loss of Madrid irreparably damaged King Joseph's pro-French government.

The battle followed a frustrating six weeks for Wellington. As he advanced into central Spain, the Duke had been blocked by Marmont's army, which was constantly swelled by reinforcements. Wellington withdrew as the odds turned against him, with his armies often marching close together and Marmont repeatedly threatening Wellington's supply line. By the day of the battle Wellington had decided to withdraw his army all the way back to Portugal, but observed that Marmont had made the tactical error of separating his left flank from the main body of his army.
Wellington's reaction has been differently reported, with little emphasis that both he and Marmont had been looking for an opening for weeks. The Duke immediately ordered the major part of his army to attack the overextended French left wing.
Battle of Salamanca, etched by J. Clarke,
coloured by M. Dubourg.
Marshal Marmont's 50,000-man Army of Portugal contained eight infantry and two cavalry divisions, plus 78 artillery pieces. The infantry divisions were Maximilien Sebastien Foy's 1st (4,900), Bertrand Clausel's 2nd (6,300), Claude François Ferey's 3rd (5,400), Jacques Thomas Sarrut's 4th (5,000), Antoine Louis Popon de Maucune's 5th (5,000), Antoine François Brenier de Montmorand's 6th (4,300), Jean Guillaume Barthélemy Thomières's 7th (4,300), and Jean Pierre François Bonet's 8th (6,400). Pierre François Joseph Boyer led 1,500 dragoons and Jean-Baptiste Theodore Curto commanded 1,900 light cavalry. Louis Tirlet directed 3,300 artillerymen and there were also 1,300 engineers, military police and wagon drivers.

Wellington's 48,500-man army included eight infantry divisions and two independent brigades, five cavalry brigades and 54 cannons. The infantry divisions were Henry Campbell's 1st (6,200), Edward Pakenham's 3rd (5,800), Galbraith Lowry Cole's 4th (5,191), James Leith's 5th (6,700), Henry Clinton's 6th (5,500), John Hope's 7th (5,100) and Charles Alten's Light (3,500). Carlos de España commanded a 3,400-man Spanish division, while Denis Pack (2,600) and Thomas Bradford (1,900) led Portuguese brigades.

Stapleton Cotton supervised the cavalry brigades. These included 1,000 British heavy dragoons (1st Cavalry Brigade) led by John Le Marchant, 1,000 British light dragoons (2nd Cavalry Brigade) under George Anson, 700 Anglo-German light horse under Victor Alten, 800 King's German Legion (KGL) heavy dragoons led by George Bock and 500 Portuguese dragoons under Benjamin d'Urban. Hoylet Framingham commanded eight British (RHA: Ross, Bull, Macdonald; RA: Lawson, Gardiner, Greene, Douglas, May) and one Portuguese (Arriaga) six-gun artillery batteries.

Marmont's army moved south early on 22 July, its leading elements reaching an area southeast of Salamanca. To the west, the Marshal could see Wellington's 7th Division deployed on a ridge.

Spotting a dust cloud in the distance, Marmont assumed that most of the British army was in retreat and that he faced only a rearguard. He planned to move his French army south, then west to turn the British right flank.

This was a mistake as Wellington had most of his forces hidden behind the ridge, while his 3rd and 5th Divisions were en route from Salamanca. Wellington had planned to retreat if outflanked, but waited to see if Marmont would make a blunder.

The Marshal's army planned to move along an L-shaped ridge, with its angle near a steep height known as the Greater Arapile.

That morning, the French occupied only the short, north-pointing part of the L. For his flanking move, Marmont marched his divisions west along the long side of the L.

The Anglo-Allied army lay behind another L-shaped ridge, inside and parallel to the French L, and separated from it by a valley. Unseen by the French, Wellington assembled a powerful striking force along the long side of the British L.

As Marmont moved westward, the French became strung out along the long side of the L. Thomières's division led the way, supported by Curto's cavalry.

After that Maucune, Brenier, and Clausel. Bonet, Sarrut and Boyer advanced close to the Greater Arapile, while Foy and Ferey held the short side of the L.


Map of the battle
When the British 3rd Division and D'Urban's brigade reached the top of the French L, they attacked Thomières. At the same time, Wellington launched the 5th and 4th Divisions, backed by the 7th and 6th Divisions, at the long side of the French L.

The 3rd Division came at the head of Thomières's division in a two-deep line. Despite its deployment in column formation, the French division initially repulsed its attackers, but was then charged and routed by a bayonet charge. Thomières was killed. Seeing British cavalry in the area, Maucune formed his division into squares, the standard formation to receive a mounted attack, but a poor choice when defending against infantry. With their two-deep line, Leith's 5th Division easily defeated Maucune in a musketry duel. As the French foot soldiers fell back, Cotton ordered Le Marchant's brigade (5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd and 4th Dragoons) to attack them. Maucune's men were cut to pieces by the heavy cavalrymen's sabres. Many of the survivors surrendered.

Le Marchant hurriedly reformed his troopers and sent them at the next French division, which was winded from a rapid march. The heavy dragoons mauled Brenier's hastily formed first line, but Le Marchant pressed his luck too far. He was killed trying to break a French square in Brenier's second line. William Ponsonby succeeded to command of the brigade.

During this crisis, the French army lost its commander. As Pakenham's 3rd Division prepared to attack Thomières, Marmont finally woke up to his army's peril. He dashed for his horse, but was caught in a British shellburst which broke his arm and two ribs. His second-in-command, Bonet, was wounded very soon afterwards. Records conflict however, with Marmont claiming that he was wounded as his wing became overextended, and his incapacitation led to the error not being corrected before Wellington attacked. His enemies place the time of his wounding as during Wellington's attack. For somewhere between 20 minutes and over an hour, the Army of Portugal remained leaderless.

  Cole's 4th Division attacked Bonet's division while Pack's Portuguese assaulted the Greater Arapile. With the help of a 40-gun battery firing from the Greater Arapile, both attacks were repulsed by the French.

Assuming command, general Clausel did his best to salvage the dire situation. He committed Sarrut's division to shore up the wrecked left flank, then launched a dangerous counterattack at Cole's 4th Division using his own and Bonet's divisions, supported by Boyer's dragoons. This attack brushed aside Cole's survivors and struck the 6th Division in Wellington's second line.

Marshal Beresford reacted promptly to the developing threat and immediately sent Spry's Portuguese brigade of the 5th Division to engage the French infantry, while Wellington moved the 1st and 7th Divisions to assist. After bitter resistance, the divisions of Clausel and Bonet were defeated and the French army began to retreat.

As the rest of the French army streamed away, Ferey formed his division into a single three-deep line, with each flank covered by a battalion in square. Led by Clinton's victorious 6th Division, the British came up to this formation and were initially repulsed.
After ordering his artillery to crossfire through the centre of the French line, Wellington ordered a second assault. This attack broke Ferey's division and killed its commander.

Foy's division covered the French retreat towards Alba de Tormes, where there was a bridge they could use to escape. Wellington, believing that the Alba de Tormes crossing was blocked by a Spanish battalion in a fortified castle, directed his pursuit along a different road. De Espana, however, had withdrawn the unit without informing Wellington, which allowed the French to escape. The Army of Portugal suffered 7,000 killed and wounded and 7,000 captured.

Besides Marmont's severe wounding, two divisional commanders were killed and another wounded. Half of the 5,214 Anglo-Allied losses came from the 4th and 6th Divisions. Cotton, Cole, and Leith were all wounded.


At the Battle of Salamanca, Sir Edward Pakenham's 3rd Division charges Thomieres
The battle established Wellington as an offensive general. It was said that he "defeated an army of 40,000 men in 40 minutes." Six days after the battle, Foy wrote in his diary,

"This battle is the most cleverly fought, the largest in scale, the most important in results, of any that the English have won in recent times. It brings up Lord Wellington's reputation almost to the level of that of Marlborough. Up to this day we knew his prudence, his eye for choosing good positions, and the skill with which he used them. But at Salamanca he has shown himself a great and able master of manoeuvring. He kept his dispositions hidden nearly the whole day: he allowed us to develop our movement before he pronounced his own: he played a close game: he utilized the oblique order in the style of Frederick the Great."

The Battle of Salamanca was a damaging defeat for the French and while they regrouped, Anglo-Portuguese forces entered Madrid on 6 August. The Siege of Burgos ensued, then in the autumn the Anglo-Portuguese retreated to Portugal when renewed French concentrations threatened to trap them.

A failure by Spanish troops to guard a crucial escape route over the bridge at Alba de Tormes tainted the victory. This may have resulted from a misunderstanding between Spanish and British commanders. Subsequent pursuit failed to destroy or to capture the fleeing French.

Action at Garcia Hernandez
The following day, Wellington's King's German Legion (KGL) heavy dragoons performed the astounding feat of "breaking a square" and overrunning a portion of the French rearguard at the Battle of Garcia Hernandez. Moreover, they accomplished this twice within a few minutes.

  Imperial Eagle
Two Imperial Eagles were captured at Salamanca. Ensign John Pratt of the Light Company of the 2nd Battalion 30th Foot took the Eagle of the 22nd Line Regiment, which is today on display in the Queen's Lancashire Regiment Museum at Fulwood Barracks in Preston, Lancashire. The Eagle of the French 62nd Line (Thomières) was captured by Lieutenant Pearce of the 2nd Battalion 44th East Essex Regiment, a part of Lieutenant General Leith's 5th Division.

Cultural references
The battle is mentioned in Tolstoy's novel War and Peace, Book 3 Chapter XXVI. Prior to the Battle of Borodino, Tolstoy describes Napoleon as receiving an aide-de-camp, Fabvier, who has just arrived with news of the Battle of Salamanca. "Fabvier told him of the heroism and devotion of his troops fighting at Salamanca, at the other end of Europe, but with one thought – to be worthy of their Emperor – but with one fear – to fail to please him.
The result of that battle had been deplorable. Napoleon made ironic remarks during Fabvier's account, as if he had not expected that matters could not go otherwise in his absence".

The battle features in Sharpe's Sword by Bernard Cornwell, in which Richard Sharpe helps Wellington bring the French to battle by feeding a known French spy false information. Cornwell also duplicated Wellington's tactics in this battle, in his retelling of Arthur's victory at the Battle of Mount Badon, in The Warlord Chronicles.

The battle is described in Suzanna Clarke's Jonathan Strange and Mr. Norrell, during the time that Jonathan Strange served under Lord Wellington.

Salamanca Place, in Hobart, Tasmania, commemorates the battle. Mount Wellington is nearby.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Siege of Burgos
At the Siege of Burgos, from 19 September to 21 October 1812, the Anglo-Portuguese Army led by General Arthur Wellesley, Marquess of Wellington tried to capture the castle of Burgos from its French garrison under the command of General of Brigade Jean-Louis Dubreton.
The French repulsed every attempt to seize the fortress, resulting in one of Wellington's rare withdrawals, as he went on to defeat the army sent to flank him at the Lines Of Torres Vedras, pursued them and then returned to complete the siege of Burgos and capture the city. The siege took place during the Peninsular War, part of the Napoleonic Wars. Burgos is located about 210 kilometres (130 mi) north of Madrid.

After crushing Marshal Auguste Marmont's French army at the Battle of Salamanca in July 1812, Wellington exploited his great victory by advancing on Madrid. After the disaster, King Joseph Bonaparte and Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jourdan retreated to Valencia where they sought refuge with Marshal Louis Gabriel Suchet. The magnitude of Wellington's triumph also compelled Marshal Nicolas Soult to evacuate Andalucia in the south and withdraw to Valencia. The combined armies of Soult and Joseph soon posed a serious menace to Wellington's grasp on Madrid. The recently defeated French army in the north also built up its strength. Wellington made plans to counter the southern French threat while hoping to quickly capture the strategically important Burgos position, which was an important French supply base.

Instead, Dubreton led a masterful defense, thwarting Wellington's assaults time after time. The British commander's hopes were blasted when his attempts to contain the twin French counteroffensives failed.

With large French relief armies approaching Burgos from the northeast and Madrid from the southeast, the British commander withdrew to the west, abandoning large areas of Spain that had been recently liberated. That fall the French lost an opportunity to defeat Wellington's army. Nevertheless, during the withdrawal to Portugal the Anglo-Portuguese army lost many men to pursuing French cavalry and starvation.

Wellington's victory over Marshal Marmont at the Battle of Salamanca on 22 July 1812 gravely weakened the French position in Spain. Before the engagement, King Joseph had set out with 14,000 troops, intending to reinforce the marshal, who was unaware that help was on the way. On 25 July, Joseph received a report from the wounded Marmont which covered up the extent of the disaster. Soon, General of Division Clausel reported the true state of affairs. He wrote to the king, "armies usually suffer in morale after a setback, [but] it is hard to understand the extent of discouragement existing in this one. I cannot conceal that a very bad spirit prevails. Disorders and the most revolting excesses mark every stage of our retreat." Joseph immediately withdrew toward Madrid. Desperate to salvage the situation, the king ordered Marshal Nicolas Soult to send help and to evacuate Andalucia, but the marshal refused.

On 30 July, Wellington's army reached Valladolid, northwest of Madrid. Leaving 18,000 troops with Lieutenant General Henry Clinton to watch Clausel, the British army commander turned toward Madrid with 36,000 men. On 11 August, General of Division Anne-François-Charles Trelliard's dragoon division fought an inconclusive skirmish with the Allies at the Battle of Majadahonda northwest of Madrid. At first, the French dragoons routed Brigadier General Benjamin d'Urban's Portuguese cavalry. After also driving back Major General George Bock's King's German Legion (KGL) heavy dragoons, the French were finally stopped by fire from the 1st KGL Light Infantry Battalion and the approach of heavy reinforcements. King Joseph evacuated Madrid which the Anglo-Portuguese entered on 12 August, to the cheers of the inhabitants. The following day, the Retiro forts surrendered to Wellington, yielding 2,046 prisoners, large stocks of clothing and equipment, and the eagles of the 13th Dragoon and the 51st Line Infantry Regiments.


Harassed by guerillas and tortured by thirst, Joseph's soldiers retreated all the way to the east coast city of Valencia, which they reached on 31 August. Valencia was held by Marshal Louis Gabriel Suchet. Wellington knew that if Joseph and Soult joined forces, his position in central Spain would become perilous. He counted on the autumn rains keeping the Tagus River high and preventing Joseph and Soult from threatening his southern flank. He hoped that the Spanish might delay any French counterattack toward Madrid. He also believed that the capture of Burgos would slow any French drive from the north.

To Wellington's amazement, Clausel quickly rallied his beaten army and launched a raid in the north. On 13 August, the French general marched on Valladolid with 25,000 troops. In the face of this advance, Clinton fell back to Arévalo with 7,000 soldiers while José María Santocildes's Spanish corps abandoned Valladolid. Clausel sent his lieutenant Maximilien Sebastien Foy to rescue the trapped French garrisons. While the Spanish attackers concluded the Siege of Astorga before he could reach it, Foy rescued the garrisons of Toro and Zamora and reunited with Clausel at Valladolid on 4 September. Wellington and 21,000 troops rejoined Clinton at Arévalo on 3 September. The British army commander set out after Clausel, but that general easily shook off his pursuers and dashed out of reach, leaving a garrison of 2,000 men in Burgos. Wellington left Lieutenant General Rowland Hill to defend Madrid with 31,000 Anglo-Portuguese and 12,000 Spanish. This force included Wellington's three best divisions.


The Siege of Burgos, by François Joseph Heim, 1813
San Miguel Hornwork

The 35,000-man Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish army laid siege to the castle of Burgos on 19 September. General of Brigade Jean-Louis Dubreton commanded two battalions of the 34th Line Infantry Regiment, one battalion of the 130th Line, one artillery company, one sapper company, nine heavy cannons, 11 field pieces, and six mortars, altogether 2,000 troops. The inner Burgos defenses contained a stronghold known as the Napoleon Battery. Historians differ as to how many heavy guns Wellington had available. Michael Glover wrote that the British had only three 18-pound cannon with 1,306 rounds. David Gates asserted that Wellington only brought eight siege guns though many more recently captured pieces were available. Chris McNab credited the British with having a total of eight 24-pound guns.

Admiral Sir Home Popham of the Royal Navy offered to land more heavy guns at Santander, but Wellington declined to use this resource. After costly assaults at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, he was loath to mount a massive infantry attack. At the time, the British army's sapper corps, then called Military Artificers, was seriously understrength. At Burgos, there were only five engineer officers and eight sappers. During the siege operation, one of the sappers was killed and other seven were wounded.

On the night of 19 September, Wellington ordered an assault on the San Miguel hornwork, which guarded the fort's northeast approaches. Launched without the benefit of artillery support, the 1st Battalion of the 42nd Foot was spotted by the French in the moonlight and over 200 men were mowed down. Brigadier General Denis Pack's Portuguese brigade suffered an additional 100 losses. Fortunately for the British, the flank companies of the 1st/42nd Foot, 1st/24th Foot, and 1st/79th Foot were able to gain access to the rear of the hornwork. From there they opened a scattered fire on the French. The defenders suddenly stampeded, leaving the hornwork in the Allies' possession. The 1st Battalion of the 34th Line lost 138 killed and wounded, plus 60 men and seven guns captured. Allied losses numbered 421 killed and wounded.

  Burgos Castle
Wellington quickly began planting batteries around the castle. But hoping to get lucky again, he launched an attack on 23 September before his guns were ready for action. The 1st and 6th Divisions rushed forward against the undamaged walls but were easily repelled with 200 men killed and wounded. The engineers then began digging a mine under the fort's west wall. When this was detonated on 29 September, the British dashed forward but were soon driven back from the intact defenses. It turned out that the mine was run under an ancient buried wall that was in front of the modern wall. Consequently, the French defenses were unscathed by the explosion.

A frustrated Wellington ordered his engineers to dig a new mine. Meanwhile, he had his soldiers work overnight to erect a breaching battery close to the walls. At daybreak on 1 October, the French discovered this position and immediately zeroed in their defending artillery. They rapidly destroyed two of the three cannons and inflicted heavy losses on the gun crews. The following night the British reestablished the battery only to see it destroyed again in the morning.

On 2 October, Wellington asked Popham to send two 24-pound cannons to replace his lost artillery. As it happened, these guns would not arrive in time. When the new mine was finally ready on 4 October, it was fired, blowing a gap in the northwest wall. The subsequent attack managed to secure a foothold in the outer defenses after heavy fighting and 220 casualties.

After the Allies began digging a new trench against the inner defenses, Dubreton launched a sortie without warning. The attackers killed and wounded almost 150 Allies and carried off or spoiled much of their equipment. No sooner had Wellington resumed siege operations than Dubreton struck again. With perfect timing, the French swarmed out of the fort and inflicted 184 casualties while suffering small losses. Rain began to fall in sheets, flooding the siege trenches. The British guns ran so low on ammunition that French cannonballs were retrieved and reused. Wellington wrote, "This is altogether the most difficult job I ever had in hand with such trifling means. God send that they may give me a little more time."

On 18 October, a mine was detonated under the Chapel of San Roman near the south wall. Under cover of this feint, assaults were mounted against the west and north walls. As before, these attacks withered in the face of intense fire and 170 more casualties were added to the butcher's bill. With a French army threatening his position, Wellington made preparations to retreat. However, he was unable to withdraw all his siege guns. The engineers tried to demolish the captured hornwork, but their charges failed to explode. British losses in the siege amounted to 550 killed, 1,550 wounded, and three guns. The French lost 304 killed and 323 wounded, plus the 60 captured.
Soult raised the Siege of Cadiz on 25 August 1812 and abandoned a huge wagon train of booty in Seville on the 28th. By the end of September, Soult was in contact with Suchet and Joseph. On 15 October, Joseph's forces moved on Madrid with 61,000 soldiers and 84 guns. Soult's column was on the left while a second column under Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Comte d'Erlon marched to Soult's right. In the north, General of Division Joseph Souham's 41,000-man Army of Portugal was swollen to 53,000 by transferring 6,500 infantry and 2,300 cavalry from the Army of the North and by 3,400 reinforcements from France.

To hold off these heavy concentrations, Wellington deployed 73,000 troops. At Burgos, he had 24,000 Anglo-Portuguese and Santocildes' 11,000 Spaniards. In the south Hill occupied Toledo with 20,000 soldiers while Major General Charles Alten held Madrid with 18,000. Angry that Wellington had been offered the supreme command in Spain, General Francisco Ballesteros refused to obey the British general's orders to obstruct Soult's move. High hopes had been placed on 8,000 Anglo-Sicilians under Lieutenant General Thomas Maitland at Alicante on the east coast. Maitland remained completely inert during this crisis. Wellington was 150 miles (241 km) north of Madrid at Burgos, dangerously separated from Hill's army. To make matters worse, the Tagus was not a serious military obstacle because of unexpectedly low water. When Wellington realized how badly he was outnumbered by Souham, he felt lucky to get away intact. He later wrote, "I had no reason to believe the enemy were so strong till I saw them. Fortunately, they did not attack me: if they had, I must have been destroyed." Even so, he was loath to undertake a long retreat.

Wellington raised the siege of Burgos on 21 October. He quietly slipped away, undetected by the French until late on 22 October. The drawn Battle of Venta del Pozo was fought on the 23rd. The bulk of the Allied army fell back behind the Pisuerga River at Torquemada that day. Between 25 and 29 October, Souham and Wellington fought a series of actions along the Pisuerga and Carrión Rivers at Palencia, Villamuriel de Cerrato, and Tordesillas which are collectively called the Battle of Tordesillas. When the French seized the bridge over the Duero River at Tordesillas on the 29th, Wellington was compelled to order a retreat.

On 29 October, Hill received Wellington's positive order to abandon Madrid and march to join him. After a clash with Soult's advance guard at Perales de Tajuña on the 30th, Hill broke contact and withdrew in the direction of Alba de Tormes. Joseph re-entered his capital on 2 November. Anxious to destroy the British, Joseph rushed after them without bothering to leave a garrison in Madrid. The Allied retreat continued until Wellington and Hill joined forces on 8 November near Alba de Tormes.

On 15 November, Soult's 80,000 Frenchmen faced Wellington's 65,000 Allies on the old Salamanca battlefield. To the disappointment of many French soldiers and generals, Soult declined to attack. Wellington began retiring west that afternoon.

Logistical arrangements in Wellington's army collapsed and the Allied soldiers marched in cold pouring rain for four days with very little food. Soult only sent his cavalry after the Allies. Even so, the French horsemen scooped up hundreds of stragglers. On 16 November, 600 Allied soldiers were captured by the French.


The number of prisoners was even higher on the 17th and included Wellington's second-in-command, General Edward Paget. Before reaching the friendly fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, the Allied armies lost 5,000 men missing, mostly soldiers who had died from hunger or exposure in the chaotic retreat. It appeared that all of Wellington's efforts in 1812 had been for nothing. Yet, his Anglo-Portuguese army had gained a moral ascendancy over the French that it would never relinquish.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Tordesillas

In the Battle of Tordesillas or Battle of Villamuriel or Battle of Palencia between 25 and 29 October 1812, a French army led by Joseph Souham pushed back an Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish army commanded by Arthur Wellesley, Marquess Wellington. After its failed Siege of Burgos, the 35,000-man Allied army withdrew to the west, pursued by Souham's 53,000 French soldiers. On 23 October, French cavalry attacked the Allied rear guard in the inconclusive Battle of Venta del Pozo. The Allies pulled back behind the Pisuerga and Carrión Rivers and took up a defensive position.

Beginning on the 25th there were clashes at Palencia and Villamuriel de Cerrato as Souham sought to turn the Allied north flank. Wellington then adopted an unorthodox defensive position, prompting Souham to pause for two days. The stalemate was broken on 29 October when a party of naked French soldiers swam the Duero River at Tordesillas with their weapons on a raft. Upon reaching the far bank, they took up their guns and routed the Brunswick defenders of a key bridge. With an intact bridge in French hands, Wellington was forced to continue his retreat toward Portugal.

Meanwhile, Wellington's subordinate Rowland Hill withdrew from Madrid. The two British commanders united their armies near Alba de Tormes on 8 November. By this time the combined French armies were led by Nicolas Soult. Though 80,000 French faced 65,000 Allies on the old Salamanca battlefield neither commander initiated a battle, whereupon Wellington began a withdrawal. After a retreat in miserable conditions during which hundreds of soldiers were captured of died of hunger and exposure, the Allied army went into winter quarters. The actions were fought during the Peninsular War, part of the Napoleonic Wars.

On 22 July 1812, General Arthur Wellesley, Marquess Wellington's won a great victory over Marshal Auguste Marmont's Army of Portugal at the Battle of Salamanca. Marmont was badly wounded, two of his division commanders were killed, and his army severely mauled with 10,000 killed and wounded. An additional 4,000 soldiers, 20 cannons, two eagles, and six colors were captured for Allied losses of 4,762 men. King Joseph Bonaparte evacuated Madrid and its forts surrendered to the Allies on 13 August. One major consequence of Salamanca was that Marshal Nicolas Soult raised the two and one-half year Siege of Cadiz on 25 August 1812 and abandoned the province of Andalusia.
Hoping to exploit the summer's successes, Wellington began the Siege of Burgos on 19 September 1812. Burgos' 2,000-man garrison was led by General of Brigade Jean-Louis Dubreton who supervised a very able and aggressive defense. During their futile siege, the Allies suffered 2,100 casualties before withdrawing on 21 October. While Wellington was attempting to reduce Burgos, the French reacted promptly to the crisis. To oppose his 35,000-man army, General of Division Joseph Souham assembled 53,000 men in the north of Spain. This force included 41,000 men of the reconstituted Army of Portugal, 6,500 infantry and 2,300 cavalry from the Army of the North, and a 3,400-man brigade from Bayonne. In the south, Soult and Joseph advanced on Madrid with 61,000 soldiers and 84 guns. To oppose these masses, Lieutenant General Rowland Hill had 31,000 Anglo-Portuguese and 12,000 Spaniards. Wellington's host included 24,000 Anglo-Portuguese and 12,000 Spanish troops under General José María Santocildes.

Wellington stole a march on Souham and the Frenchman did not discover the Allied retreat until late on 22 October. Souham immediately launched almost 6,000 cavalry in pursuit of his enemies. On the 23rd, the Allied main body crossed the Pisuerga River at Torquemada and spread out to defend the west bank. The same day, the French cavalry fought Wellington's rear guard[8] in the drawn Battle of Venta del Pozo. The Allies counted 230 casualties while the French lost about 200 men.

On 25 October, Souham advanced on Wellington's center and left flank which were posted along the Pisuerga and Carrión Rivers with his right flank at Valladolid. A French probe of his center was repulsed by the 5th Division, but on the left a Spanish division was driven from Palencia on the east bank of the Carrión. The Spanish were pursued so closely that the French got across the Carrión bridge before it could be blown up and General of Division Maximilien Sebastien Foy's division secured a bridgehead. General of Division Antoine Louis Popon de Maucune's division crossed the Carrión farther south at Villamuriel de Cerrato. Since, Foy's and Maucune's thrusts threatened to cut off a portion of his army, Wellington committed four brigades to drive Maucune back.

After a tough fight the French were ejected from Villamuriel. In these operations, the French inflicted 800 casualties on the Allies while losing only 350 men. With his river defenses outflanked by Foy, Wellington ingeniously shifted his army to the east bank of the Pisuerga. While on the 23rd he held the west bank of the Pisuerga, on the 25th he defended the east bank. Planting his left flank (formerly his right) at Valladolid and securing his right flank on a tributary river 20 miles (32 km) upstream, the British army commander held a strong position. The baffled Souham ordered a reconnaissance as he pondered the situation for two days, then Foy scored another coup.

On 29 October, Captain Guingret led 54 men of the 6th Light Infantry Regiment across the Duero River at Tordesillas. The soldiers stripped naked and silently swam across the river, towing a raft with their weapons. Taking up their muskets, they attacked the bridge guard which consisted of a half-company of the Brunswick Oels Jägers. Surprised and attacked from an unexpected direction, the Brunswick officer and his men fled, allowing the French to capture the bridge along with nine prisoners, while suffering no losses.

The seizure of a bridge to the west compromised Wellington's defensive line. Though Wellington managed to contain the French bridgehead, he was forced to order a retreat.

Soon afterward, Souham's pursuit slackened when General of Division Marie-François Auguste de Caffarelli du Falga reclaimed 12,000 Army of the North troops and returned to the Bay of Biscay coast to deal with a new outbreak of Spanish guerilla attacks.

Following instructions from Wellington, Hill evacuated Madrid on 31 October 1812. Hill's 4,000-man rear guard held off Soult's advance guard at the Aranjuez bridge on the 30th. A week later, he linked up with Wellington near Alba de Tormes. Meanwhile, Souham joined Soult on 8 November. On 10 and 11 November the two armies sparred along the Tormes River near Alba. Twelve voltiguer (light infantry) companies and the 45th Line Infantry Regiment of the French 5th Division were repelled by Brigadier General Kenneth Howard's brigade of the 2nd Division. This unit included the 1st Battalions of the 50th Foot, 71st Foot, and 92nd Foot and was supported by 2nd and 14th Portuguese Line Infantry Regiments. Casualties amounted to 158 French, 69 British, and 44 Portuguese. Disappointed here, Soult's army crossed the Tormes farther south and Wellington fell back.
On 15 November, 80,000 French troops faced 65,000 Allied soldiers on the old Salamanca battlefield. To the fury of the French soldiers and officers, Soult failed to order an attack. Instead, Wellington began retreating that afternoon. As the Allies marched away, rain began to fall continuously. As the supplies in the Salamanca depots were feverishly packed up and sent away, Wellington's logistical arrangements collapsed completely. Fortunately for the Allies, Joseph had forbidden all but his cavalry to pursue. On 16 November at Matilla de los Caños del Río, Brigadier General Victor Alten with 1,300 men clashed with 2,000 French cavalry consisting of the 2nd Hussar, 5th and 27th Chasseurs à Cheval and 7th Lancer Regiments. Alten had the 1st and 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion and the 14th Light Dragoons, as well as two cannons and the light company of the 1st Battalion of the 28th Foot. The French lost 50 men, almost all of whom were wounded and captured, while Alten's command suffered 34 casualties.

Already demoralized by having to retreat, the Allied soldiers were soon forced to survive on acorns when the inept Quartermaster General James Willoughby Gordon directed the supply trains onto the wrong road. On 17 November, Gordon sent the cavalry rear guard off to a flank and for a time the retreating infantry were directly exposed to the attentions of the French cavalry. On this day, Wellington's second-in-command Edward Paget was made a prisoner by the French horsemen. The misery of the hungry foot soldiers was intense as they struggled to march on muddy roads in the cold weather.
  During the retreat three of Wellington's division commanders took matters into their own hands. Lieutenant General William Stewart and two others decided to disobey the army commander's direct order to retreat by a certain road. Stewart was joined by Lieutenant General James Broun-Ramsay, Lord Dalhousie and either Major General John Oswald or Lieutenant General Henry Clinton.

When Wellington found them in the morning, the three divisions were in complete confusion. Later the army commander was asked what he said in the situation and he replied, "Oh, by God, it was too serious to say anything." On 16 November, the French cavalry rounded up 600 stragglers and the following day, they captured even more.

The Allies staggered into their base at Ciudad Rodrigo on 19 November. Two-fifths of the army's soldiers were either ill or missing. The humor of the rank and file was not improved when Wellington issued a nasty letter to his division and brigade commanders and it was leaked to the press. A total of 5,000 men were missing. While many of the missing were on the way to French prison camps, the majority had died from starvation or hypothermia. Though the Allied army had apparently been defeated, in fact much had been accomplished in 1812. The French had been ejected from the cities of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Seville, and Astorga, and the provinces of Andalusia, Extremadura, and Asturias.

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U.S. presidential election, Madison James defeats Clinton DeWitt

James Madison
Hegel: "Science of Logic"

The Science of Logic (German: Wissenschaft der Logik) is the work in which Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich  outlined his vision of logic, which is an ontology that incorporates the traditional Aristotelian syllogism as a sub-component rather than a basis. For Hegel, the most important achievement of German Idealism, starting with Kant and culminating in his own philosophy, was the demonstration that reality is shaped through and through by mind and, when properly understood, is mind.

Thus ultimately the structures of thought and reality, subject and object, are identical. And since for Hegel the underlying structure of all of reality is ultimately rational, logic is not merely about reasoning or argument but rather is also the rational, structural core of all of reality and every dimension of it. Thus Hegel's Science of Logic includes among other things analyses of being, nothingness, becoming, existence, reality, essence, reflection, concept, and method. As developed, it included the fullest description of his dialectic. Hegel considered it one of his major works and therefore kept it up to date through revision.
The Science of Logic is sometimes referred to as the Greater Logic to distinguish it from the condensed version of it he presented in what is called the Lesser Logic, namely the Logic section of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.

Brief history of the book
Hegel wrote 'The Science of Logic' after he had completed his Phenomenology of Spirit and while he was in Nuremberg working at a secondary school and courting his fiancée.

It was published in a number of volumes. The first, ‘The Objective Logic’, has two parts (the Doctrines of Being and Essence) and each part was published in 1812 and 1813 respectively.

The second volume, ‘The Subjective Logic’ was published in 1816 the same year he became a professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. The Science of Logic is too advanced for undergraduate students so Hegel wrote an Encyclopaedic version of the logic which was published in 1817.

In 1826 the book went out of stock. Instead of reprinting, as requested, Hegel undertook some revisions. By 1831 Hegel completed a greatly revised and expanded version of the ‘Doctrine of Being’, but had no time to revise the rest of the book.

The Preface to the second edition is dated 7 November 1831, just before his death on 14 November 1831. This edition appeared in 1832, and again in 1834–5 in the posthumous Works. Only the second edition of Science of Logic is translated into English.

Hegel's General Concept of Logic

According to Hegel, logic is the form taken by the science of thinking in general. He thought that, as it had hitherto been practiced, this science demanded a total and radical reformulation “from a higher standpoint.” His stated goal with The Science of Logic was to overcome what he perceived to be a common flaw running through all other former systems of logic, namely that they all presupposed a complete separation between the content of cognition (the world of objects, held to be entirely independent of thought for their existence), and the form of cognition (the thoughts about these objects, which by themselves are pliable, indeterminate and entirely dependent upon their conformity to the world of objects to be thought of as in any way true). This unbridgeable gap found within the science of reason was, in his view, a carryover from everyday, phenomenal, unphilosophical consciousness.

The task of extinguishing this opposition within consciousness Hegel believed he had already accomplished in his book Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) with the final attainment of Absolute Knowing: “Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because ... it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the object from the certainty of itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and certainty with truth.”

Once thus liberated from duality, the science of thinking no longer requires an object or a matter outside of itself to act as a touchstone for its truth, but rather takes the form of its own self-mediated exposition and development which eventually comprises within itself every possible mode of rational thinking. “It can therefore be said,” says Hegel, “that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.” The German word Hegel employed to denote this post-dualist form of consciousness was Begriff (traditionally translated either as Concept or Notion).
General Division of the Logic
The self-exposition of this unified consciousness, or Notion, follows a series of necessary, self-determined stages in an inherently logical, dialectical progression. Its course is from the objective to the subjective "sides" (or judgements as Hegel calls them) of the Notion. The objective side, its Being, is the Notion as it is in itself [an sich], its reflection in nature being found in anything inorganic such as water or a rock. This is the subject of Book One: The Doctrine of Being. Book Three: The Doctrine of the Notion outlines the subjective side of the Notion as Notion, or, the Notion as it is for itself [für sich]; human beings, animals and plants being some of the shapes it takes in nature. The process of Being’s transition to the Notion as fully aware of itself is outlined in Book Two: The Doctrine of Essence, which is included in the Objective division of the Logic. The Science of Logic is thus divided like this:

Volume One: The Objective Logic
   Book One: The Doctrine of Being
   Book Two: The Doctrine of Essence
Volume Two: The Subjective Logic
   Book Three: The Doctrine of the Notion

This division, however, does not represent a strictly linear progression. At the end of the book Hegel wraps all of the preceding logical development into a single Absolute Idea. Hegel then links this final absolute idea with the simple concept of Being which he introduced at the start of the book. Hence the Science of Logic is actually a circle and there is no starting point or end, but rather a totality. This totality is itself, however, but a link in the chain of the three sciences of Logic, Nature and Spirit, as developed by Hegel in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), that, when taken as a whole, comprise a “circle of circles.”
Objective Logic: Doctrine of Being
Determinate Being (Quality)

A. Being

Being, specifically Pure Being, is the first step taken in the scientific development of Pure Knowing, which itself is the final state achieved in the historical self-manifestation of Geist (Spirit/Mind) as described in detail by Hegel in Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807). This Pure Knowing is simply Knowing as Such, and as such, has for its first thought product Being as Such, i.e., the purest abstraction from all that is (although, importantly, not distinct from, or alongside, all that is), having "no diversity within itself nor with any reference outwards. ... It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness."

EXAMPLE: Hegel claims that the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides was the person who "first enunciated the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth."

B. Nothing

Nothing, specifically Pure Nothing, "is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content." It is therefore identical with Being, except that it is thought of as its very opposite. This distinction is therefore meaningful as posited by thought.

EXAMPLE: in Hegel's estimation, Pure Nothing is the absolute principle "in the oriental systems, principally in Buddhism."

C. Becoming

Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same, and yet absolutely distinct from each other. This contradiction is resolved by their immediate vanishing, one into the other. The resultant movement, called Becoming, takes the form of reciprocal Coming-to-Be and Ceasing-to-Be.

EXAMPLE: Hegel borrows Kant's example of the "hundred dollars" [Critique of Pure Reason (1787) to emphasize that the unity of Being and Nothing in Becoming only applies when they are taken in their absolute purity as abstractions. It is of course not a matter of indifference to one's fortune if $100 is or is not, but this is only meaningful if it is presupposed that the one whose fortune it might or might not be, already is, i.e., the $100's being or not must be referenced to an other's. This, then, cannot be Pure Being which by definition has no reference outwards. Heraclitus is cited as the first philosopher to think in terms of Becoming.

Determinate Being
A. Determinate Being as Such
The transition between Becoming and (a) Determinate Being as Such is accomplished by means of sublation. This term, the traditional English translation of the German word aufheben, means to preserve, to maintain, but also to cease, to put an end to. Hegel claims that it is “one of the most important notions in philosophy.” Being and Nothing were complete opposites whose inner unity needed to be expressed, or mediated, by a third term: Becoming. Once having been accomplished through mediation, their unity then becomes immediate. Their opposition, still extant in Becoming, has been “put an end to.” From the newly acquired standpoint of immediacy, Becoming becomes Determinate Being as Such, within which Being and Nothing are no longer discrete terms, but necessarily linked moments that it has “preserved” within itself. Sublation, then, is the ending of a logical process, yet at the same time it is its beginning again from a new point of view.

So, as moments of Determinate Being, Being and Nothing take on new characteristics as aspects of (b) Quality. Being becomes emphasized, and, as Quality, is Reality; Nothing, or Non-Being, is concealed in Being’s background serving only delimit it as a specific Quality distinct from others, and, in so doing, is Negation in General, i.e., Quality in the form of a deficiency. Quality, then, comprises both what a Determinate Being is and is not, viz., that which makes it determinate in the first place. Within Quality, however, Reality and Negation are still distinct from one another, are still mediated, just like Being and Nothing were in Becoming. Taken in their unity, that is, in their immediacy as, again, sublated, they are now only moments of (c) Something.

EXAMPLE: Hegel contrasts his logically derived notion of Reality from the earlier metaphysical one present in the ontological “proof” of God’s existence, specifically Leibniz’s formulation of it. In this theory, God was held to be the sum-total of all realities. These realities are taken to be “perfections,” their totality therefore comprising the most perfect being imaginable: God. Speculative logic, however, shows that Reality is inextricably bound up with its own negation, and so any grand total of these realities would not result in something strictly positive, e.g., God, but would inevitably retain, to an equal degree, the negation of all these realities. The mere addition of realities to each other, then, would not in any way alter their principle, and so the sum of all realities would be no more or less than what each of them already was: a Reality and its Negation.

Something is the first instance in The Science of Logic of the “negation of the negation”. The first negation, Negation in General, is simply what a Determinate Being is not. Hegel calls this “abstract negation”. When this negation itself is negated, which is called “absolute negation,” what a Determinate Being is, is no longer dependent on what it is not for its own determination, but becomes an actual particular Something in its own right: a Being-Within-Self. Its negation, what it is not, is now “cut off” from it and becomes another Something, which, from the first Something’s point of view, is an Other in general. Finally, just as Becoming mediated between Being and Nothing, Alteration is now the mediator between Something and Other.

  B. Finitude
(a) Something and Other are separate from each other, but each still contains within itself, as moments, their former unity in Determinate Being. These moments now re-emerge as Being-in-Itself, i.e., Something as Something only insofar as it is in opposition to the Other; and Being-for-Other, i.e., Something as Something only insofar as it is in relation to the Other. (Hegel’s view is in this way contrasted with Kant’s noumenon, the unknowable “thing in itself”: Being-in-itself taken in isolation from Being-for-Other is nothing but an empty abstraction and to ask “what it is” is to ask a question made impossible to answer.)

Something is now no longer only an isolated something, but is in both positive and negative relationship to the Other. This relationship, however, is then reflected back into the Something as isolated, i.e., in-itself, and bestows upon it further determinations. What a Something is in opposition to an Other is its (b) Determination; what it is in relation to an Other is its Constitution.

EXAMPLE: A human being’s Determination is thinking reason, since that is what she unalterably is in opposition to her Other: nature. However, humans are entangled in nature in myriad other ways than just thinking rationally about it, and how humans react to this external influence also tells us about what they are. This is their Constitution, the part of their being that undergoes alteration in relation to its Others.

The point at which Something ceases to be itself and becomes an Other is that Something’s Limit. This Limit is also shared by its Other which is itself an other Something only insofar as it is on the far side of this Limit. It is therefore by their common Limits that Somethings and Others are mediated with one another and mutually define each other's inner Qualities.

EXAMPLE: The point at which a point ceases to be a point and becomes a line constitutes the Limit between them. However, a line is not only something other than a point, i.e., only a Determinate Being, but its very principle is at the same time defined by it, just as a plane is defined by the line and the solid by the plane, etc.

From the perspective of the Limit, a Something is only a particular Something insofar as it is not something else. This means that the Something’s self-determination is only relative and entirely dependent on what it isn’t to be what it is. It is thus only temporary, contains its own Ceasing-to-Be within itself and so is (c) Finite, i.e., doomed to eventually cease to be. For Finite things, “the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.” At this point the Limit ceases to play its mediating role between Something and Other, i.e., is negated, and is taken back into the self-identity―the Being-Within-Self―of the Something to become that Something’s Limitation, the point beyond which that Something will cease to be. The flip side of this, though, is that the Limit also takes its negative along with it back into the Something, this being the Other yet now as posited in the Something as that Something’s very own Determination. What this means is that, in the face of its own Limitation, the very Quality that defined the Something in the first place becomes the Other to its own self, which is to say that it no longer strictly is this Quality but now Ought to be this Quality.

Limitation and the Ought are the twin, self-contradictory moments of the Finite.

EXAMPLE: "The sentient creature, in the limitation of hunger, thirst, etc., is the urge to overcome this limitation and it does overcome it. It feels pain, and it is the privilege of the sentient nature to feel pain; it is a negation in its self, and the negation is determined as a limitation in its feeling, just because the sentient creature has the feeling of its self, which is the totality that transcends this determinateness [i.e., it feels it Ought not to feel pain]. If it were not above and beyond the determinateness, it would not feel it as its negation and would feel no pain."

Once again, sublation occurs. Both Limitation and the Ought point beyond the Finite something, the one negatively and the other positively. This beyond, in which they are unified, is the Infinite.

C. Infinity
The negation that Being-in-Itself experienced in the Limitation, the negation that made it Finite, is again negated resulting in the affirmative determination of (a) the Infinite in General which now reveals itself, not as something distinct from, but as the true nature of the Finite.

“At the name of the infinite, the heart and the mind light up, for in the infinite the spirit is not merely abstractly present to itself, but rises to its own self, to the light of thinking, of its universality, of its freedom.”

This affirmation of the Infinite, however, carries with it a negative relation to an other, the Finite. Because of this, it falls back into the determination of the Something with a Limit peculiar to itself.

This In-finite, then, is not the pure Infinite, but merely the non-Finite. Hegel calls this the Spurious Infinite and it is this that is spoken of whenever the Infinite is held to be over and above―separated from―the Finite. This separateness is in itself false since the Finite naturally engenders the Infinite through Limitation and the Ought, while the Infinite, thus produced, is bounded by its Other, the Finite, and is therefore itself Finite.

Yet they are held to be separate by this stage of thought and so the two terms are eternally stuck in an empty oscillation back and forth from one another.

This Hegel calls (b) the Infinite Progress.

  This impasse can only be overcome, as usual, via sublation. From the standpoint of the Finite, the Infinite cannot break free into independence, but must always be bounded, and therefore finitized, by its Other, the Finite. For further logical development to be possible, this standpoint must shift to a new one where the Infinite is no longer simply a derivation of the Finite, but where the Finite, as well as the Infinite in General, are but moments of (c) the True Infinite. The True infinite bears the same relation of mediation to these moments as Becoming did to Being and Nothing and as Alteration did to Something and Other.

EXAMPLE: Hegel gives as a symbol of the Infinite Progress the straight line which stretches out to infinity in both directions. This Infinity is, at all times, the beyond of the Determinate Being of the line itself. True Infinity is properly represented by the “circle, the line which has reached itself, which is closed and wholly present, without beginning and end.”

This move is highly significative of Hegels’s philosophy because it means that, for him, “[it] is not the finite which is the real but the infinite.” The reality of the True Infinite is in fact “more real” than the Reality of Determinate Being. This higher, and yet more concrete, reality is the Ideal [das Ideell]: “The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being.”

As having been sublated, the mediation which was performed by the True Infinite between the Finite and the Infinite now has resulted in their immediate unity. This unity is called Being-for-Self.


A. Being-for-Self as Such

At this point we have arrived back at simple Being from which all the previous developments had initially proceeded. This Being, though, is now in the standpoint of Infinity from which these developments can be seen as moments of itself and so it is (a) Being-for-Self as Such. Until this point Determinate Being was burdened with Finitude, depended on the Other for its own determination, and so was only relatively determined Being. From the Ideal standpoint of Infinity, Being-for-Self has become free from this burden and so is absolutely determined Being.

As a consequence of having overcome this relativity, however, both sides of the relationship between Something and Other are now also in equal relation to the Infinite Being that they have become Ideal moments of. So, although through their relationship Something and Other mutually determine each other’s inner Qualities, they do not have the same effect on the Infinite Being―be it God, spirit or ego (in the Fichtean sense)―to which they are now objects. This Being is not just another Finite Other, but is the One for which they are and of which they are a part. The Being-for-Other of Finitude has become the (b) Being-for-One of Infinity.

EXAMPLE: This Being-for-One recalls Leibniz’s monad because it involves a simple oneness that maintains itself throughout the various determinations that might take place within it. Hegel, however, is critical of Leibniz’s construction because, since these monads are indifferent to each other and, strictly speaking, are not Others to one another, they cannot determine each other and so no origin can be found for the harmony that is claimed to exist between them. Being-for-One, containing as it does the moments of determination within it, avoids this contradiction.

If we now take in isolation that to which all the preceding moments refer, i.e., that which we now have immediately before us, we end up with (c) the One.

B. The One and the Many
This (a) One in its Own Self, standing in negative relation to all its preceding moments, is entirely differentiated from each of them. It is neither a Determinate Being, nor a Something, nor a Constitution, etc. It is therefore indeterminate and unalterable.
There is Nothing in it. Just as there is no criterion to distinguish Being and Nothing despite the fact that they are opposites, the One is also identical with its opposite, (b) the Void. The Void can be said to be the Quality of the One.

EXAMPLE: At this stage, the Logic has incorporated the ancient atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. Hegel actually held the ancient philosophical notion of atomism in higher esteem than the scientific one of modern physics because the former understood the void not just as the empty space between atoms, but as the atom’s own inherent principle of unrest and self-movement. “Physics with its molecules and particles suffers from the atom ... just as much as does that theory of the State which starts from the particular will of individuals.”

The original transition of Being and Nothing to Determinate Being is again echoed here in the sphere of Being-for-Self. The One, though, as negatively related to all aspects of Quality excepting its own Quality of being the Void, cannot take on a Qualitative determinateness like Determinate Being did. In its own self-differentiation, it can only relate to itself as another self identical to it, that is, as another One. Since no new Quality has been taken on, we cannot call this transition a Becoming, but rather a Repulsion, i.e., the positing of (c) Many Ones.

  C. Repulsion and Attraction
Once these many Ones have been posited, the nature of their relationship begins to unfold. Because it is the nature of the One to be purely self-related, their relation to one another is in fact a non-relation, i.e., takes place externally in the Void. From the standpoint of the one One, then, there are no other Ones, that is, its relation to them is one of (a) Exclusion. Seen from within the One there is only one One, but at the same time the One only exists in the first place through its negative external relation to other Ones, i.e., for there to be the one One there must be Many Ones that mutually Exclude one another.

EXAMPLE: The idea that the One is entirely self-subsistent and can exist without the Many is, according to Hegel, “the supreme, most stubborn error, which takes itself for the highest truth, manifesting in more concrete forms as abstract freedom, pure ego and, further, as Evil.”

Now that Many Ones have been posited out of their Repulsion from the One, their original Oneness reasserts itself and their Repulsion passes over to (b) Attraction. Attraction presupposes Repulsion: for the Many to be Attracted by the One, they must have at first been Repulsed by it.

The One having been restored to unity by Attraction now contains Repulsion and Attraction within it as moments. It is the Ideal One of Infinite Being, which, for Hegel, actually makes it more “real” than the merely Real Many. From the standpoint of this Ideal One, both Repulsion and Attraction now presuppose each other, and, taken one step further, each presupposes itself as mediated by the other.

The One is only a One with reference to another One―Repulsion; but this “other” One is in itself identical to, is in fact, the original One―Attraction: each is the moment of the other. This is the (c) Relation of Repulsion and Attraction, which at this point is only relative.

EXAMPLE: Although in Hegel’s estimation a triumph of the explanatory power of metaphysics over the physics based on sense perception as it was then practised, he believed that Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft [Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science] (1786) retained many of the errors committed by the latter, foremost among these being that, since matter is given to the senses as already formed and constituted, it is taken to be such by the mind as well. The forces of Attraction and Repulsion that are supposed to act upon matter to set it in motion, then, are not seen also to be the very forces though which matter itself comes into being in the first place.
Repulsion and Attraction are relative to one another insofar as the One is taken either as the beginning or result of their mediation with one another. Imparted with continuous, Infinite motion, the One, Repulsion and Attraction become the sublated moments of Quantity.


Magnitude (Quantity)


A. Pure Quantity

The previous determinations of Being-for-Self have now become the sublated moments of Pure Quantity. Pure Quantity is a One, but a One made up of the Many having been Attracted back into each other out of their initial Repulsion. It therefore contains Many identical Ones, but in their coalescence, they have lost their mutual Exclusion, giving us a simple, undifferentiated sameness. This sameness is Continuity, the moment of Attraction within Quantity. The other moment, that of Repulsion, is also retained in Quantity as Discreteness. Discreteness is the expansion of the self-sameness of the Ones into Continuity. What the unity of Continuity and Discreteness, i.e., Quantity, results in is a continual outpouring of something out of itself, a perennial self-production.

EXAMPLE: “[S]pecific examples of pure quantity, if they are wanted, are space and time, also matter as such, light, and so forth, and the ego itself.” Hegel here sharply criticizes Kant’s antinomy, put forth in his Critique of Pure Reason, between indivisibility and infinite divisibility in time, space and matter. By taking continuity and discreteness to be entirely antithetical to one another, instead of in their truth which is their dialectical unity, Kant becomes embroiled in self-contradiction.

B. Continuous and Discrete Magnitude

Although unified in Quantity, Continuity and Discreteness still retain their distinction from one another. They cannot be cut off from each other, but either one can be foregrounded leaving the other present only implicitly. Quantity is a Continuous Magnitude when seen as a coherent whole; as a collection of identical Ones, it is a Discrete Magnitude.

C. Limitation of Quantity

Quantity is the One, but containing within it the moments of the Many, Repulsion, Attraction, etc. At this point the negative, Excluding nature of the One is reasserted within Quantity. The Discrete Ones within Quantity now become Limited, isolated Somethings: Quanta.

A. Number
The first determination of quantum is Number. Number is made up of a One or Many Ones—which, as quanta, are called Units—each of which is identical to the other. This identity in the Unit constitutes the Continuity of Number. However, a Number is also a specific Determinate Being that encloses an aggregate of Units while excluding from itself other such aggregates. This, the Amount, is the moment of Discreteness within Number.

Both Qualitative and Quantitative Determinate Being have Limits that demarcate the boundary between their affirmative presence and their negation, but in the former the Limit determines its Being to be of a specific Quality unique to itself, whereas in the latter, made up as it is of homogeneous Units that remain identical to each other no matter which side of the Limit they fall upon, the Limit serves only to enclose a specific Amount of Units, e.g., a hundred, and to distinguish it from other such aggregates.

EXAMPLE: The species of calculation—counting, addition/subtraction, multiplication/division, powers/roots—are the different modes of bringing Numbers into relation with each other. Although the progress through these modes displays the same sort of dialectical evolution as does the Logic proper, they are nonetheless entirely external to it because there is no inner necessity in the various arrangements imposed on them by arithmetical procedure.

With the expression 7 + 5 = 12, although 5 added to 7 necessarily equals 12, there is nothing internal to the 7 or the 5 themselves that indicates that they should be brought in any sort of relation with one another in the first place.

For this reason, number cannot be relied upon to shed any light on strictly philosophical notions, despite the ancient attempt by Pythagoras to do so. It can however be used to symbolize certain philosophical ideas. As for math as a pedagogical tool, Hegel presciently had this to say: “Calculation being so much an external and therefore mechanical process, it has been possible to construct machines which perform arithmetical operations with complete accuracy.

A knowledge of just this one fact about the nature of calculation is sufficient for an appraisal of the idea of making calculation the principal means for educating the mind and stretching it on the rack in order to perfect it as a machine.”

  B. Extensive and Intensive Quantum
Taken in its immediacy, a Number is an Extensive Magnitude, that is, a collection of a certain Amount of self-same Units. These Units, say ten or twenty of them, are the sublated moments of the Extensive Magnitudes ten or twenty. However, the Number ten or twenty, though made up of Many, is also a self-determining One, independent of other Numbers for its determination. Taken in this way, ten or twenty (a) differentiates itself from Extensive Magnitude and becomes an Intensive Magnitude, which is expressed as the tenth or twentieth Degree. Just as the One was completely indifferent to the other Ones of the Many yet depended on them for its existence, each Degree is indifferent to every other Degree, yet they are externally related to one another in ascending or descending flow through a scale of Degrees.

Although thus differentiated from each other, Extensive and Intensive magnitude are essentially (b) the same. “[T]hey are only distinguished by the one having amount within itself and the other having amount outside itself.” It is at this point that the moment of the Something reasserts itself having remained implicit over the course of the development of Quantity. This Something, which reappears when the negation between Extensive and Intensive Magnitude is itself negated, is the re-emergence of Quality within the dialectic of Quantity.

EXAMPLE: Weight exerts a certain pressure which is its Intensive Magnitude. This pressure, however, can be measured Extensively, in pounds, kilograms, etc. Heat or cold can be Qualitatively experienced as different Degrees of temperature, but can also be Extensively measured in a thermometer. High and low Intensities of notes are the results of a greater or smaller Amount of vibrations per unit of time. Finally, “in the spiritual sphere, high intensity of character, of talent or genius, is bound up with a correspondingly far-reaching reality in the outer world, is of widespread influence, touching the real world at many points.”

In the realm of Quantity, the relationship between Something and Other lacked any mutual Qualitative Determinateness. A One could only relate to another One identical to itself. Now, however, that Qualitative Determinateness has returned, the Quantum loses its simple self-relation and can relate to itself only through a Qualitative Other that is beyond itself. This Other is another Quantum, of a greater or lesser Amount, which, in turn, immediately points beyond itself to yet an Other Quantum ad infinitum. This is what constitutes the self-propelled (c) Alteration of Quantum.

C. Quantitative Infinity
Although a particular Quantum, of its own inner necessity, points beyond itself, this beyond is necessarily an Other Quantum. This fact, that Quantum eternally repulses itself, yet equally eternally remains Quantum, demonstrates the (a) Notion of Quantitative Infinity, which is the self-related, affirmative opposition between Finitude and Infinity that lies within it. This irresolvable self-contradiction within Quantum yields (b) the Quantitative Infinite Progress. This progress can take place in one of two directions, the greater or the smaller, giving us the so-called “infinitely great” or “infinitely small.” That these “infinites” are each the Spurious Quantitative Infinite is evident in the fact that “great” and “small” designate Quanta, whereas the Infinite by definition is not a Quantum.

EXAMPLE: Hegel here gives several examples of the appearance of the Spurious Quantitative Infinite in philosophy, namely in Kant’s notion of the sublime and his categorical imperative, as well as Fichte’s infinite ego as outlined in his Theory of Science (1810). At bottom of all these ideas, says Hegel, is an absolute opposition that is held to exist between the ego and its other, this latter taking the form, respectively, of art, nature and the non-ego in general. The opposition is supposed to be overcome by the positing of an infinite relation between the two sides, the ego’s level of morality, for example, ever increasing in proportion to a decrease in the power of the senses over it. According with the nature of the Spurious Quantitative Infinite, however, it does not matter how great a level the ego raises itself to, the absolute opposition between it and its other is there and everywhere reasserted and the whole process can have no other outcome than a desperate and futile longing.

The Quantitative Infinite negates Quantum, and Quantum in turn negates Infinity. As occurs so often in The Science of Logic, a negation that is itself negated produces a new affirmative standpoint, the formerly negated terms having become the unified moments thereof. This standpoint is (c) the Infinity of Quantum from where it is seen that Infinity, initially the absolute Other of Quantum, essentially belongs to it and in fact determines it as a particular Quality alongside all the other Determinate Beings that had long since been sublated. This particular Quality which distinguishes Quantum from any other Qualitatively Determined Being is in fact the total lack of explicit self-determinateness that differentiated Quantity from Quality in the first place. The repulsion of Quantum from itself out into the beyond of Infinity, is actually a gesture back towards the world of Qualitative Determination, thus bridging once again the two worlds. This gesture is made explicit in the Quantitative Ratio, where two Quanta are brought into relationship with one another in such a way that neither one in itself is self-determined, but in relating to each other, they Qualitatively determine something beyond themselves, e.g., a line or a curve.

EXAMPLE: Hegel here engages in a lengthy survey of the history and development of the Differential and Integral Calculus, citing the works of Cavalieri, Descartes, Fermat, Barrow, Newton, Leibniz, Euler, Lagrange, Landen, and Carnot. His main point of concern is the compulsion of mathematicians to neglect the infinitesimal differences that result from calculus equations in order to arrive at a coherent result. The inexactitude of this method of procedure results, says Hegel, primarily from their failure to distinguish between Quantum as the Quantity that each individual term of a differential co-efficient represents, and the Qualitative nature of their relationship when in the form of a ratio. “Dx, dy, are no longer quanta, nor are they supposed to signify quanta; it is solely in their relation to each other that they have any meaning, a meaning merely as moments.”

The Quantitative Relation

A. The Direct Ratio

A ratio, such as x:y, is a Direct Ratio if both terms of the ratio are delimited by a single Quantum, a constant, k (what Hegel calls in the language of his day the "exponent" of the ratio),

 k =  {y \over x}.

In the Direct Ratio, the previously sublated Quantitative moments of Amount and Unit are retrieved and brought into immediate relation with each other. One side of the ratio, y, is a certain Amount relative to the other side, x, which serves as the Unit whereby this Amount is measured. If the constant is given, then the Quantum on any one side of the ratio could be any Number, and the Number on the other side will automatically be determined. Therefore, the first Number of the ratio completely loses its independent significance and only functions as a determinate Quantum in relation to an other. Formerly, any single Number could simultaneously denote either an Amount or a Unit; now, it must serve exclusively as the one or the other in relation to another Number serving as the opposite. The constant would seem to bring these moments back into unity with each other, but in actuality, it too can serve only as either Amount or Unit. If x is Unit and y Amount, then k is the Amount of such Units,

 y = kx ;\,

if x is Amount, then k is the Unit, the amount of which, y, determines it,

 x = y/k .\,

As in themselves incomplete in this way, these Quanta serve only as the Qualitative moments of one another.

B. Inverse Ratio

The Inverse Ratio is a ratio, x:y, in which the relation between both sides is expressed in a constant which is their product, i.e.,

 k = xy\,


y = {k \over x}.

Whereas formerly with the Direct Ratio, the quotient between the two terms was fixed, in the Inverse Ratio it becomes alterable. Because the Inverse Ratio confines within itself many Direct Ratios, the constant of the former displays itself not merely as a Quantitative, but also as a Qualitative Limit. It is therefore a Qualitative Quantum. The Spurious Infinity/True Infinity dialectic again makes an appearance here as either term of the ratio is only capable of infinitely approximating the ratio's constant, the one increasing in proportion to a decrease in the other, but never actually reaching it (neither x nor y may equal zero). The constant is nonetheless present as a simple Quantum, and is not an eternal beyond, making its self-mediation through the two terms of the ratio an example of True Infinity.

C. The Ratio of Powers

The Ratio of Powers takes the following form:

y = k^x.\,

It is in this form of the Ratio, says Hegel, that “quantum has reached its Notion and has completely realized it.” In the Direct and Inverse Ratios, the relation between the constant and its variables was not continuous, the former only being a fixed proportionality between them, and the latter relating itself to them only negatively. With the Ratio of Powers, however, this relationship is not simply one of external limitation, but, as a Quantum brought into relationship with itself through the power, it is self-determining Limit. This self-determination constitutes the Quality of the Quantum, and finally demonstrates the full significance of the essential identity of Quality and Quantity. Originally, Quantity differentiated itself from Quality in that it was indifferent to what was external to it, that which it quantified. Now however, in the Ratio of Powers, what it relates itself to externally is determined by its own self, and that which relates externally to its own self has long since been defined as Quality. “But quantity is not only a quality; it is the truth of quality itself.” Quantum, having sublated the moment of Quantity that originally defined it and returned to Quality, is now what it is in its truth: Measure.

Specific Quantity
A. The Specific Quantum
“Measure is the simple relation of the quantum to itself ... ; the quantum is thus qualitative.” Previously, Quantum was held to be indifferent to the Quality of that which it quantified. Now, as Measure, Quality and Quantity though still distinct from one another are inseparable and in their unity comprise a specific Determinate Being: “Everything that exists has a magnitude and this magnitude belongs to the nature of the something itself.” The indifference of Quantum is retained in Measure insofar as the magnitude of things can increase or decrease without fundamentally altering their Quality, and yet their essential unity nevertheless manifests at the Limit where an alteration in Quantity will bring about a change in Quality.

EXAMPLE: Aristotle gives the example of a head from which hairs are plucked one by one. It’s Quality of being a head of hair remains if only a few hairs are gone, but at a certain point, it undergoes Qualitative Alteration and become a bald head. Although the Quantitative change is gradual, the Qualitative one, oftentimes, is “unexpected”. “It is the cunning of the Notion to seize on this aspect of a reality where its quality does not seem to come into play; and such is its cunning that the aggrandizement of a State or of a fortune, etc., which leads finally to disaster for the state or for the owner, even appears at first to be their good fortune.”

  B. Specifying Measure
Insofar as Quantity describes the upper and lower Limits between which a specific Quality can maintain itself, it serves as a (a) Rule. The Rule is an arbitrary external standard or Amount that measures something other than itself. Although it is often tempting to assume so, there is in actuality no object that can serve as a completely universal standard of measurement, i.e., be pure Quantity.

Rather, what is involved in measurement is a ratio between two Qualities and their inherent Quantities, the one made to act as the (b) Specifying Measure of the other, this other, however, being itself just as capable of measuring that which it is being measured by.

EXAMPLE: In the measure of temperature, we take the expansion and contraction of mercury relative to the heat it contains as a Quantitative Rule for the increase or decrease of temperature in general by dividing the range of its change in magnitude into a scale of arithmetical progression. Tempting though it is to believe, this is not the measure of temperature as such, but only the measure of how Quantitative change specifically affects the Quality of mercury.

The water or air the mercury thermometer measures has a very different Qualitative relationship to changes in the Quantity of heat which do not necessarily bear any direct relation to mercury’s.

Thus, what is actually going on when we take a temperature is a relationship of comparison between two Qualities and their respective natures when exposed to a Quantitative increase or decrease in heat, and not a universal determination by some disembodied, abstract “thing” that is temperature itself.

So long as we arbitrarily use the Quantitative properties of some Quality or other as a Rule to Measure the magnitude of other Qualities, we abstract from it its Qualitative nature. However, once we have established a Quantitative ratio between two or more Qualities, we can give this ratio an independent existence that Quantitatively unites things that are Qualitatively distinct. We can thus take the Qualities of both sides into account, the independent, or Realized, Measure serving as their (c) Relation. This Measure necessarily involves variable magnitudes since the Qualitatively distinct ways in which different things relate to Quantity can only be registered in their respective rates of increase or decrease relative to each other. Further, in order for each side of the ratio to fully reflect the distinctiveness of the Quality it represents, both sides must be Quantitatively self-related, i.e., take the form of powers as in the case of the Ratio of Powers explicated above.
EXAMPLE: Velocity is the ratio of space’s relation to time:
v = {d \over t}.
It is only an intellectual abstraction, though, since it merely serves to measure space by the Rule of time or time by the Rule of space. It supplies no objective standard for the inherent Quantitative relation to each other that pertains to their specific Qualities. The formula for a falling body comes closer,
 d = at^2\,
but here time is still serving as an arbitrary Rule, that is, it is assumed to vary in a simple arithmetical progression. It is the form of motion described by Kepler’s third law of planetary motion that comes closest for Hegel to being a Realized Measure of the relation between the inherent Qualities of space and time:
 d^3 = at^2\,.
C. Being-For-Self in Measure
Although now united by the Quantitative Ratio, the two or more Qualities thus brought into relation retain their mutual separation as distinct Qualities. For example, even though we can determine the Quantitative relationship between space and time in the example of a falling body, each of them can still be considered on its own, independent of the other. However, if we then take the constant produced by the ratio of the two sides as a self-subsistent Something in its own right, that is, a Being-For-Self, then the two formerly entirely distinct Qualities become its own sublated moments, their very natures now seen to have been in fact derived from this relation of Measure in the first place.
Real Measure
A. The Relation of Self-Subsistent Measures
Real Measure gives us a new standpoint external to the different Measures being brought into relation with each other, this relation now designating the independent existence of an actual physical Something. This Something gains its Qualitative determination from the Quantitative (a) combination between two Measures immanent in it, i.e., volume and weight. One designates an inner Quality, in this case weight; the other designates an external Quality, in this case volume, the amount of space it takes up. Their combination gives us the ratio of weight to volume which is its specific gravity.

The constant that results from this ratio is the inner characteristic Real Measure of the thing in question, but, taking the form as it does of a mere number, a Quantum, this constant is likewise subject to alteration, i.e., addition, subtraction, etc. Unlike mere Quantum, however, the Real Measure of a thing is inwardly determined, and so preserves itself somewhat in alteration. If two material things are combined, the dual Measures of the one are added to those of the other. The degree to which they exhibit self-preservation is registered in the internal Measure—weight in this case—which ends up being equal, after combination, to the sum of the original two Measures; the degree to which they exhibit Qualitative alteration is registered in the external Measure—space in this case—which does not necessarily result in a sum equal to its parts, but often in the case of material substances exhibits a diminution in overall volume.

If we adopt the constant of one specific Real Measure as our Unit, the constants of other Real Measures can be brought into relation to it as Amounts in a (b) series of Measure relations. Since it is arbitrary which one Real Measure in such a series will serve as the Unit, there are as many incommensurable series of Measure relations as there are individual Real Measures. However, when two Real Measures, which are themselves ratios, are combined, the result is a new ratio of those ratios, itself designated by a constant in the form of a Quantum.

If this constant is adopted as the Unit, instead of an individual Real Measure, then what were two incommensurable series are now made commensurable with each other in a common denominator.

  Since each Real Measure within a series forms such a constant with every other member in that series, any individual series in which a particular Real Measure serves as the Unit can be made commensurable with any other series with a different Real Measure as Unit. Since it is a thing’s Real Measure that determines its specific Quality, and since that Real Measure is in turn derived from the Quantitative relation it has with other Real Measures in the form of a series of constants, it would appear that, as in Determinate Being above, Quality is only relative and externally determined.
However, as we have seen, a Real Measure also has an internal relation that gives it a self-subsistence that is indifferent to any external relation. Therefore, the series of Quantitative relationships between these Real Measures only determines the (c) Elective Affinity between their different Qualities, but not these Qualities themselves.

The Quantity/Quality dialectic manifests itself in the realm of Elective Affinity in that a Real Measure within in a series will not necessarily resonate Qualitatively with those in another series even if they bear a proportional Quantitative relationship. In fact, the specific Quality of a particular Real Measure is in part registered by the other Real Measures it has a special Affinity for, that is, how it responds to Quantitative Alteration. It is the Intensive side of Quantity (see above) such as it relates to specific Real Measures that determines its Qualitative behaviour when subject to changes in Extensive Quantity.

EXAMPLE: Hegel makes it clear that the above analysis applies to the system of chemical affinities and that of musical harmony. In the case of the latter, for example, each individual note is a Real, self-subsistent Measure, consisting as it does of a specific internal ratio between, say, the length and thickness of a guitar string. An individual note, however, only achieves meaning in its relation to a system of other notes that are brought into Quantitative relation to each other through a specific note that serves as the Unit, or key. A note serving as the key in one system, is equally an individual member in other systems in which other notes play this role. Notes that harmonize when played together are demonstrating their Elective Affinity for one another, that is, the higher Qualitative unity that results from a combination in which each individual note nevertheless retains its self-subsistence.


B. Nodal Line of Measure-Relations
The relation of Elective Affinity is an external relation between two Real Measures that is determined by their Quantitative aspects. In and of themselves, each Real Measure retains its Qualitative indifference to all others, even those it has Affinity for. Real Measures, however, are also subject to internal alteration akin to what has already been discussed in “Measure” above, i.e., that its Quality can be maintained only within a certain Quantitative range beyond which it undergoes a sudden “leap” into another Quality. These different Qualities form Nodes on a line of gradual Quantitative increase or decrease.

EXAMPLE: Natural numbers consist of a series of numbers that gradually increase by one in perpetual succession. However, some of these numbers relate in specific ways to others, being their multiple, power or root, etc., and thus constitute “Nodes.” Transition from the liquid to the frozen state in water does not occur gradually with a diminution of temperature, but all of a sudden at 0°C. Finally, the “state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere change in size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion.” Thus, contrary to Aristotle’s doctrine that natura non facit saltum, according to Hegel nature does make leaps.

C. The Measureless

Measure, being the unity of Quality and Quantity, now transitions into its version of the Infinite, the Measureless, which accordingly is the unity of the Qualitative and Quantitative Infinites. In the Measureless, the Quantitative Infinite is manifested in the potential of the Nodal line to increase endlessly; the Qualitative Infinite is manifested as the eternal beyond of any particular Qualitative determination. Seeing as the successive determinations are self-generated by an internal Quantitative Alteration of Measure, they can now be seen, from the standpoint of the Measureless, to be different States of one and the same Substrate. The nature of the Substrate is not tied, like the Something was, to a merely external Qualitative appearance, but represents the underlying unity of a variety of internally determined appearances, which are its States.

The Becoming of Essence

A. Absolute Indifference

This Substrate, as what persists through the succession of States, is in a relation of Absolute Indifference to every particular determination—be it of quality, quantity or measure—that it contains. It is merely the abstract expression of the unity that underlies their totality.
B. Indifference as Inverse Ratio of its Factors

Taken in its immediacy, this Indifference is simply the result of all the different determinatenesses that emerge within it. It itself does not determine its own inner fluctuations, i.e., is not self-determining. However, in accordance with the measure relations developed so far, each of its moments are in reciprocal, quantitatively determined ratios with one another. Formerly, from the standpoint of Quality, a sufficient Quantitative increase or decrease would result in a sudden transition from one Quality to another. Now, with Absolute Indifference as our standpoint, every possible Qualitative determination is already implicitly related to every other by means of a Quantitative ratio. Every Quality is connected to, and in equilibrium with, its corresponding other. It is therefore no longer meaningful to say that something can have “more” or “less” of one Quality than another as if each Quality were absolutely distinct from each other. Whatever Quality there is “more” of in one thing than another can be equally said to be a “less” of whatever Quality exists in its stead in the other, i.e., there is an Inverse Ratio of their Factors. So, with a so-called “Quantitative” change, “one factor becomes preponderant as the other diminishes with accelerated velocity and is overpowered by the first, which therefore constitutes itself the sole self-subsistent Quality.”
  The two Qualities are no longer distinct, mutually exclusive determinations, but together comprise a single whole.

EXAMPLE: Here, Hegel makes a powerful argument in favour of the explanatory powers of his speculative philosophy over those of empirical science, specifically with regards to the concepts of centripetal and centrifugal forces as they are supposed to relate the elliptical motion of celestial bodies.

If, as is supposed by science, such an orbit is made up of an inverse relation of centripetal and centrifugal forces—the former predominating over the other as the body approaches perihelion, the reverse if approaching aphelion—then the sudden overtaking of the stronger force by the weaker that takes place on either end of the orbit can only be explained by some mysterious third force.

Indeed, what is to stop the dominant force from completely overtaking the weaker, causing the body either to crash into whatever it is orbiting or to fly off at ever accelerating speeds into space?

Only the inherent unity of the two Qualities, centripetal and centrifugal, arrived at by the ascension of thought to Absolute Indifference, can adequately explain the Notion of the elliptical orbit, says Hegel.

C. Transition into Essence

Strictly within the realm of Being, the underlying unity behind all its determinations necessarily stands externally, and in contradiction, to those determinations themselves. The transition to Essence occurs when these determinations reabsorb this unity back into themselves, i.e., they sublate it. The inherent contradiction between difference and unity is resolved when the latter is posited as the negative of the former. So, from henceforth it cannot be said that they simply emerge within the Substrate of Indifference, but that this “substrate” itself is their very own living self-relation. In other words, the differences between all the determinations of Being, namely the Quantitative difference and the inverse ratio of factors, are no longer self-subsistent, but in fact are mere moments in the expression of the implicit unity that rules them and, themselves, “are only through their repulsion from themselves.” Being has finally determined itself to no longer be simply affirmative Being, i.e., that which characterized Being as Being in the first place, but as a relation with itself, as Being-With-Self, or Essence.


Objective Logic: Doctrine of Essence
Illusory Being

A. The Essential and the Unessential

The immediate characteristic displayed by Essence, once it finally emerges from Being, is simply that it is not Being. This apparently puts us back into the sphere of Determinate Being (see above), where each side of a relation mutually determined the Other side as being not what it is. In this immediate, merely relative relation, Essence and Being thus become the Essential and the Unessential, respectively. There is nothing arising within this relation, however, to tell us what it is about something that is Essential and what Unessential. Those that apply this mode of thinking to something are making an arbitrary distinction, the opposite of which could always be claimed with equal justification. What saves Essence from falling back in to the relativism of Determinate Being is the very radical and absolute distinction from Being that defines it as Essence in the first place. Being cannot therefore simply preserve itself as an Other relative to Essence, but, having been sublated by Essence, it has for that very reason itself become nothingness, a non-essence, Illusory Being.

B. Illusory Being
So in its relation to Essence, Being has lost its being, has become Illusory. All the determinations of Being covered in the first third of the Science of Logic are no longer self-subsistent, but only “are” at all as negations of Essence. This total dependence on Essence means that there is nothing any longer in Being itself upon which any of its own determinations can be based, i.e., there is no longer any mediation within Being. This role is entirely taken up by Essence which is pure mediation relative to Illusory Being's pure immediacy. Hegel claims this is the mode of thought that corresponds to ancient skepticism as well as the “modern” idealism of Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte. Illusory Being, though not Essence itself, nevertheless belongs entirely to Essence. It is that through which Essence generates itself as what it is, namely, the purely negative as regards Being. The constant appearance and disappearance of the empty manifestations of Illusory Being can now be seen as Essence's own self-generating movement, its own Reflection.

C. Reflection
Reflection in the sphere of Essence corresponds to Becoming in the sphere of Being. However, in Being, this movement was between a positive—pure Being—and a negative—pure Nothingness. Here however, the two terms are Illusory Being and Essence. Illusory Being, as has already been established, is a nullity, nothingness. Essence, by definition, is non-being, absolute negativity. So Reflection, the movement between them, is the movement of nothing to nothing and so back to itself. Both these terms, in being absolutely negative, are identical to one another: Essence is Illusory Being and Illusory Being is Essence. They are, however, also relatively negative, in that the one is, by definition, not what the other is. This contradiction manifests in Essence in that it presupposes or posits, on its own, that which it immediately differentiates itself from: Illusory Being. This absolute recoil upon itself is Essence as a) Positing Reflection.

The next determination of Reflection, b) External Reflection, shifts the emphasis from the absolute negativity, or nothingness, in which the posited Illusory Being and its positing Essence find their identity, to the relative negativity upon which their opposition is based. Although it “knows” that the Illusory Being it finds immediately before it has been posited by none other than itself, External Refection nevertheless regards this Being as something external to it from which it returns to itself. What concerns it, therefore, is no longer the act of positing itself, but the specific determinateness of that which is posited, since it is this and nothing else that establishes its externality in the first place.

  EXAMPLE: Hegel offers for comparison with his notion of External Reflection the “reflective judgement” of Kant, which, in the Critique of Judgement, is described as the faculty of the mind that determines the universals that lie behind immediately given particulars. This action is similar to that of External Reflection with the crucial difference that, for Hegel, the universal does not simply lie “behind” the particular, but generates the particular from itself and so is the particular's own true Essence.

The immediate particular upon which Kant's judgement works is, in actuality, simply a nothingness posited by Reflection itself solely in order to generate its equally null universal, Essence.

With Positing Reflection, the Illusory Being that was posited was only a means for Essence's mediation with itself. Now, with c) Determining Reflection, not only is the moment of Illusory Being foregrounded again, but the specific determinations of this Being come into play as well. The absolute nothingness of Essence forms the background to any and all of the determinations it chooses to Reflect itself off of. These Determinations of Reflection—formerly known as Determinate Beings when they were in the realm of Quality (see above)—therefore share in the nullity that undergirds them.

This nullity actually serves to fix them eternally in their specific determination and preserve them from Alteration, because they no longer relate to each other externally as Others to one another, but internally as equals in Essence's nothingness. All the possible determinations of Being are thus preserved negatively in Essence as free Essentialities “floating in the void without attracting or repelling one another.”
Identity, Difference, Contradiction
Identity holds high importance for Hegel, writing that "all thinking involves identity and difference." Indeed it is hard to imagine any sort of life at all if we could not make use of identity, difference, and related concepts such as likeness; these principles constitute the backbone of Hegel's view of essence.

Initially he claims that "so far, then, identity is still in general the same as essence" and reminds us that identity is usually held to be the "First Original Law of Thought." The problem with identity, however, is that a statement such as A=A is a limited, one-sided statement of identity, a mere "empty tautology" that has "no content." If someone declares that the book in front of him is the book in front of him it leads nowhere, in the same way that a person claiming that "God is--God" is wasting our time. These are "boring and tedious" statements utilizing the "pure law of identity" which merely "reiterate the same thing" in Hegel's view.

As soon as "A is..." completes (is predicated by something), says Hegel, difference emerges. Thus he claims broadly that "everything is inherently contradictory." Taking "the camera is black" as our example, a camera is not the same thing as the color black, yet it is what it is (a black camera) through this resolved contradiction.

Hegel identifies three types of difference. "Absolute difference" is the most general and abstract (mental reflection) sense. "Diversity" includes the "otherness of reflection" meaning that we essentially think of how "A" is different from all other possible cases. Finally, "Opposition" is the "completion of determinate difference" with "moments that are different in one identity."

Regarding diversity, let's assume there is some person "A" who is overweight. In considering the obesity of "A" in our mental reflection we at the same time consider all the potential and possible weights that "A" is not along some continuum. "A" is not thin nor of normal weight either and this needs to be taken into consideration. Hegel says that things are different through unlikeness: this is the so-called "Law of Diversity."

Simply put ground is the "essence of essence," which for Hegel arguably means the lowest, broadest rung in his ontology because ground appears to fundamentally support his system. Hegel says, for example, that ground is "that from which phenomena is understood." Within ground Hegel brings together such basic constituents of reality as form, matter, essence, content, relation, and condition. The chapter on ground concludes by describing how these elements, properly conditioned, ultimately will bring a fact into existence (a segue to the subsequent chapter on existence).

Hegel considers form to be the focal point of "absolute ground," saying that form is the "completed whole of reflection." Broken into components, form taken together with essence gives us "a substrate for the ground relation" (Hegel seems to mean relation in a quasi-universal sense). When we combine form with matter the result is "determinate matter." Hegel thinks that matter itself "cannot be seen": only a determination of matter resulting from a specific form can be seen. Thus the only way to see matter is by combining matter with form (given a literal reading of his text). Finally, content is the unity of form and determinate matter. Content is what we perceive.

"Determinate ground" consists of "formal ground," "real ground," and "complete ground." Remember with Hegel that when we classify something as determinate we are not referring to absolute abstractions (as in absolute ground, above) but now (with determinate ground) have some values attached to some variables—or to put it in Hegel's terminology, ground is now "posited and derived" with "determinate content."

In formal ground Hegel seems to be referring to those causal explanations of some phenomena that make it what it is. In a (uncharacteristically) readable three paragraph remark, Hegel criticizes the misuse of formal grounds, claiming that the sciences are basically built upon empty tautologies. Centrifugal force, Hegel states as one of several examples drawn from the physical sciences, may be given as prime grounds (i.e. "explanation of") some phenomena, but we may later find upon critical examination that this phenomenon supposedly explained by centrifugal force is actually used to infer centrifugal force in the first place.

Hegel characterizes this sort of reasoning as a "witch's circle" in which "phenomena and phantoms run riot."

Real ground is external and made up of two substrates, both directly applicable to content (which evidently is what we seem to perceive). The first is the relation between the ground and the grounded and the second substrate handles the diversity of content. As an example Hegel says that an official may hold an office for a variety of reasons—suitable connections, made an appearance on such and such occasion, and so forth. These various factors are the grounds for his holding office. It is real ground that serves to firstly make the connection between holding office and these reasons, and secondly to bind the various reasons, i.e. diverse content, together. Hegel points out that "the door is wide open" to infinite determinations that are external to the thing itself (recall that real ground is external). Potentially any set of reasons could be given for an official to be holding office.

In complete ground Hegel brings together formal and real ground, now saying that formal ground presupposes real ground and vice versa. Complete ground Hegel says is the "total ground-relation."


Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion
This "volume" is the third major piece within the Science of Logic. Here Hegel introduces his Notion within which he extends Kant's basic schemes of judgement and syllogism classification. Hegel shows that the true idea can only be based upon valid reasoning and objectivity.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Hegel Friedrich

"The Philosophy of History"
  IDEAS that Changed the World

Myths and Legends
History of Religion
History of Philosophy
Jews in Prussia emancipated (Hardenberg reforms)
Jewish emancipation

Jewish emancipation was the external and internal process in various nations in Europe of eliminating disabilities under which Jewish people were then subject, and the recognition of Jews as entitled to equality and citizenship rights on a communal not merely individual basis. It included efforts within the community to integrate in their societies as citizens. It occurred gradually between the late 18th century and the early 20th century.

Jewish emancipation followed the Age of Enlightenment and the concurrent Jewish enlightenment. Various nations repealed or superseded previous discriminatory laws applied specifically against Jews where they resided. Before the emancipation, most Jews were isolated in residential areas from the rest of the society; emancipation was a major goal of European Jews of that time, who worked within their communities to achieve integration in the majority societies and broader education. Many became active politically and culturally within wider European civil society as Jews gained full citizenship. They emigrated to countries offering better social and economic opportunities, such as Britain and the Americas. Later, especially when faced with oppressive regimes such as the Russian Empire or continuing anti-Semitism, some European Jews turned to revolutionary movements such as Socialism and Zionism.
Jews were subject to a wide range of restrictions throughout most of European history. Since the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215, Christian Europeans required Jews and Muslims to wear special clothing, such as the Judenhut (which they traditionally wore by choice) and the yellow badge for Jews, to distinguish them from Christians. The practice of their religions was often restricted, and they had to swear special oaths. Jews were not allowed to vote, and some countries formally prohibited their entry, such as Norway, Sweden and Spain after the expulsion in the late 15th century.

In contrast, in 1264, the Polish Prince Boleslaus the Pious issued the "Statute of Kalisz" – The General Charter of Jewish Liberties in Poland, an unprecedented document in medieval history of Europe that allows Jews personal freedom, legal autonomy and separate tribunal for criminal matters as well as safeguards against forced baptism and blood libel. The Charter is ratified again by subsequent Polish Kings: Casimir the Great of Poland in 1334, Casimir IV of Poland in 1453, and Sigismund I the Old of Poland in 1539. After massive expulsions of Jews from the Western Europe (England, France, Germany, and Spain), they found a refuge in the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the Jagiellon Era Poland became the home to Europe's largest Jewish population, as royal edicts warranting Jewish safety and religious freedom from the 13th century contrasted with bouts of persecution in Western Europe, especially following the Black Death of 1348–1349, blamed by some in the West on Jews themselves. Large parts of Poland suffered relatively little from the outbreak, while the Jewish immigration brought valuable manpower and skills to the rising state. The greatest increase in Jewish numbers occurred in the 18th century, when Jews came to make up 7% of the Polish population.

The rabbinate was the highest goal of many young Jewish men, and the study of the Torah (The first five books of the Bible) and the Talmud was the means to obtain the coveted position.
Jewish involvement in gentile society began during the Age of Enlightenment. Haskalah, the Jewish movement supporting the adoption of enlightenment values, advocated an expansion of Jewish rights within European society. Haskalah followers advocated "coming out of the ghetto," not just physically but also mentally and spiritually.

On September 28, 1791, France became the second country of the world, after Poland 500 years earlier, to emancipate its Jewish population. There were 40,000 Jews living in France at the time. They were the first to confront the opportunities and challenges offered by emancipation. The civic equality the French Jews attained became a model for other European Jews. In 1796 and 1834, Holland granted the Jews equal rights with gentiles. Napoleon freed the Jews in areas he conquered in Europe outside France (see Napoleon and the Jews). Greece granted equal rights to Jews in 1830. But, it was not until the revolutions of the mid-19th century that Jewish political movements would begin to persuade governments in Great Britain, Central and Eastern Europe to grant equal rights to Jews.

  Emancipation movements
The early stages of Jewish emancipation movements were part of the general progressive efforts to achieve freedom and rights for minorities. The question of equal rights for Jews was tied to demands for constitutions and civil rights in various nations.

Jewish statesmen and intellectuals, such as Heinrich Heine, Johann Jacoby, Gabriel Riesser, Berr Isaac Berr, and Lionel Nathan Rothschild, worked with the general movement toward liberty and political freedom, rather than for Jews specifically.

In the face of persistent anti-Jewish incidents and blood libels, such as the Damascus affair of 1840, and the failure of many states to emancipate the Jews, Jewish organizations formed to push for the emancipation and protection of their people. The Board of Deputies of British Jews under Moses Montefiore, the Central consistory of Paris, and the Alliance Israelite Universelle all began working to assure the freedom of Jews.

Jewish emancipation, implemented under Napoleonic rule in French occupied and annexed states, suffered a setback in many member states of the German Confederation following the decisions of the Congress of Vienna.

In the final revision of the Congress on the rights of the Jews, the emissary of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Johann Smidt - unauthorised and unconsented to by the other parties - altered the text from "The confessors of Jewish faith are preserved the rights already conceded to them in the confederal states", by replacing a single word, which entailed serious consequences, into: "The confessors of Jewish faith are preserved the rights already conceded to them by the confederal states."
A number of German states used the altered text version as legal grounds to reverse the Napoleonic emancipation of Jewish citizens. The Prussian emissary Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Austrian Klemens von Metternich promoted the preservation of Jewish emancipation, as maintained by their own countries, but were not successful in others.

During the Revolutions of 1848, Jewish emancipation was granted by the Basic Rights of the Frankfurt Parliament (Paragraph 13), which said that civil rights were not to be conditional on religious faith. But only some German states introduced the Frankfurt parliamentary decision as state law, such as Hamburg; other states were reluctant.
Important German states, such as Prussia (1812), Württemberg (1828), Electorate of Hesse (1833), and Hanover (1842), had already emancipated their Jews as citizens.

Some early emancipated Jewish communities continued to suffer persisting or new de facto, though not legal, discrimination against those Jews trying to achieve careers in public service and education.

Those few states that had refrained from Jewish emancipation were forced to do so by an act of the North German Federation on 3 July 1869, or when they acceded to the newly united Germany in 1871. The emancipation of all Jewish Germans was reversed by Nazi Germany from 1933 through World War II.


An 1806 French print depicts Napoleon Bonaparte emancipating the Jews

Dates of emancipation
In some countries, emancipation came with a single act. In others, limited rights were granted first in the hope of "changing" the Jews "for the better."

Years when legal equality was granted to Jews

Year Country
1791 France
1796 Batavian Republic
1808 Grand Duchy of Hesse
1808 Westphalia
1811 Grand Duchy of Frankfurt
1812 Mecklenburg-Schwerin
1812 Prussia
1828 Württemberg
1830 Belgium
1830 Greece
1832 Canada
1833 Electorate of Hesse
1834 United Netherlands
1835 Sweden-Norway
1839 Ottoman Empire
1842 Kingdom of Hanover
1848 Nassau
1849 Hamburg
1849 Denmark
1856 Switzerland
1858 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
1861 Italy
1862 Baden
1863 Holstein
1864 Free City of Frankfurt
1867 Austria-Hungary
1869 North German Confederation
1871 Germany
1877 New Hampshire (last US state to enact full emancipation)
1878 Bulgaria
1878 Serbia
1890 Brazil
1910 Spain
1911 Portugal
1917 Russia
1923 Romania

Consequences of the emancipation of the Jews
The emancipation and the practice of Judaism

The emancipation disrupted the relationship the Jews had with their religion, which could not govern any longer all the actions in their lives. Many considered a practice of Judaism more closely to the lifestyle of their non-Jewish fellow citizens. The emancipation in France, Italy, Germany, at least during the Empire, permitted many Jews to leave the ghettos and contribute, as a result of the Haskalah, to the development of Reform and Conservative Judaism at the beginning of the 19th century. The emancipation contributed moreover to the assimilation of Jews and sometimes to their cultural disappearance when Jews merged through marriage in the surrounding society. It was not until Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch defined a modern vision of orthodox Judaism, enabling orthodox Jews to participate fully in a society.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browning Robert
Robert Browning, (born May 7, 1812, London—died Dec. 12, 1889, Venice), major English poet of the Victorian age, noted for his mastery of dramatic monologue and psychological portraiture. His most noted work was The Ring and the Book (1868–69), the story of a Roman murder trial in 12 books.

Robert Browning

The son of a clerk in the Bank of England in London, Browning received only a slight formal education, although his father gave him a grounding in Greek and Latin. In 1828 he attended classes at the University of London but left after half a session. Apart from a journey to St. Petersburg in 1834 with George de Benkhausen, the Russian consul general, and two short visits to Italy in 1838 and 1844, he lived with his parents in London until 1846, first at Camberwell and after 1840 at Hatcham. During this period (1832–46) he wrote his early long poems and most of his plays.

Browning’s first published work, Pauline: A Fragment of a Confession (1833, anonymous), although formally a dramatic monologue, embodied many of his own adolescent passions and anxieties. Although it received some favourable comment, it was attacked by John Stuart Mill, who condemned the poet’s exposure and exploitation of his own emotions and his “intense and morbid self-consciousness.” It was perhaps Mill’s critique that determined Browning never to confess his own emotions again in his poetry but to write objectively.

In 1835 he published Paracelsus and in 1840 Sordello, both poems dealing with men of great ability striving to reconcile the demands of their own personalities with those of the world. Paracelsus was well received, but Sordello, which made exacting demands on its reader’s knowledge, was almost universally declared incomprehensible.

Encouraged by the actor Charles Macready, Browning devoted his main energies for some years to verse drama, a form that he had already adopted for Strafford (1837). Between 1841 and 1846, in a series of pamphlets under the general title of Bells and Pomegranates, he published seven more plays in verse, including Pippa Passes (1841), A Blot in the ’Scutcheon (produced in 1843), and Luria (1846). These, and all his earlier works except Strafford, were printed at his family’s expense. Although Browning enjoyed writing for the stage, he was not successful in the theatre, since his strength lay in depicting, as he had himself observed of Strafford, “Action in Character, rather than Character in Action.”
By 1845 the first phase of Browning’s life was near its end. In that year he met Elizabeth Barrett. In her Poems (1844) Barrett had included lines praising Browning, who wrote to thank her (January 1845). In May they met and soon discovered their love for each other. Barrett had, however, been for many years an invalid, confined to her room and thought incurable.

Her father, moreover, was a dominant and selfish man, jealously fond of his daughter, who in turn had come to depend on his love.

When her doctors ordered her to Italy for her health and her father refused to allow her to go, the lovers, who had been corresponding and meeting regularly, were forced to act. They were married secretly in September 1846; a week later they left for Pisa.

Throughout their married life, although they spent holidays in France and England, their home was in Italy, mainly at Florence, where they had a flat in Casa Guidi. Their income was small, although after the birth of their son, Robert, in 1849 Mrs. Browning’s cousin John Kenyon made them an allowance of £100 a year, and on his death in 1856 he left them £11,000.

Browning produced comparatively little poetry during his married life. Apart from a collected edition in 1849 he published only Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day (1850), an examination of different attitudes toward Christianity, perhaps having its immediate origin in the death of his mother in 1849; an introductory essay (1852) to some spurious letters of Shelley, Browning’s only considerable work in prose and his only piece of critical writing; and Men and Women (1855).

This was a collection of 51 poems—dramatic lyrics such as “Memorabilia,” “Love Among the Ruins,” and “A Toccata of Galuppi’s”; the great monologues such as “Fra Lippo Lippi,” “How It Strikes a Contemporary,” and “Bishop Blougram’s Apology”; and a very few poems in which implicitly (“By the Fireside”) or explicitly (“One Word More”) he broke his rule and spoke of himself and of his love for his wife. Men and Women, however, had no great sale, and many of the reviews were unfavourable and unhelpful.

Disappointed for the first time by the reception of his work, Browning in the following years wrote little, sketching and modeling in clay by day and enjoying the society of his friends at night.

  At last Mrs. Browning’s health, which had been remarkably restored by her life in Italy, began to fail. On June 29, 1861, she died in her husband’s arms. In the autumn he returned slowly to London with his young son.

His first task on his return was to prepare his wife’s Last Poems for the press. At first he avoided company, but gradually he accepted invitations more freely and began to move in society. Another collected edition of his poems was called for in 1863, but Pauline was not included. When his next book of poems, Dramatis Personae (1864)—including “Abt Vogler,” “Rabbi Ben Ezra,” “Caliban upon Setebos,” and “Mr. Sludge, ‘The Medium’ ”—reached two editions, it was clear that Browning had at last won a measure of popular recognition.

In 1868–69 he published his greatest work, The Ring and the Book, based on the proceedings in a murder trial in Rome in 1698. Grand alike in plan and execution, it was at once received with enthusiasm, and Browning was established as one of the most important literary figures of the day. For the rest of his life he was much in demand in London society. He spent his summers with friends in France, Scotland, or Switzerland or, after 1878, in Italy.

The most important works of his last years, when he wrote with great fluency, were the long narrative or dramatic poems, often dealing with contemporary themes, such as Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau (1871), Fifine at the Fair (1872), Red Cotton Night-Cap Country (1873), The Inn Album (1875), and the two series of Dramatic Idyls (1879 and 1880). He wrote a number of poems on classical subjects, including Balaustion’s Adventure (1871) and Aristophanes’ Apology (1875). In addition to many collections of shorter poems—Pacchiarotto and How He Worked in Distemper (1876), Jocoseria (1883), Ferishtah’s Fancies (1884), and Asolando: Fancies and Facts (1889)—Browning published toward the end of his life two books of unusually personal origin—La Saisiaz (1878), at once an elegy for his friend Anne Egerton-Smith and a meditation on mortality, and Parleyings with Certain People of Importance in Their Day (1887), in which he discussed books and ideas that had influenced him since his youth.

While staying in Venice in 1889, Browning caught cold, became seriously ill, and died on December 12. He was buried in Westminster Abbey.


Thomas B. Read - Portraits of Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Robert Browning
Few poets have suffered more than Browning from hostile incomprehension or misplaced admiration, both arising very often from a failure to recognize the predominantly dramatic nature of his work. The bulk of his writing before 1846 was for the theatre; thereafter his major poems showed his increasing mastery of the dramatic monologue. This consists essentially of a narrative spoken by a single character and amplified by his comments on his story and the circumstances in which he is speaking. From his own knowledge of the historical or other events described, or else by inference from the poem itself, the reader is eventually enabled to assess the intelligence and honesty of the narrator and the value of the views he expresses. This type of dramatic monologue, since it depends on the unconscious provision by the speaker of the evidence by which the reader is to judge him, is eminently suitable for the ironist. Browning’s fondness for this form has, however, encouraged the two most common misconceptions of the nature of his poetry—that it is deliberately obscure and that its basic “message” is a facile optimism. Neither of these criticisms is groundless; both are incomplete.

Browning is not always difficult. In many poems, especially short lyrics, he achieves effects of obvious felicity. Nevertheless, his superficial difficulties, which prevent an easy understanding of the sense of a passage, are evident enough: his attempts to convey the broken and irregular rhythms of speech make it almost impossible to read the verse quickly; his elliptical syntax sometimes disconcerts and confuses the reader but can be mastered with little effort; certain poems, such as Sordello or “Old Pictures in Florence,” require a considerable acquaintance with their subjects in order to be understood; and his fondness for putting his monologues into the mouths of charlatans and sophists, such as Mr. Sludge or Napoleon III, obliges the reader to follow a chain of subtle or paradoxical arguments. All these characteristics stand in the way of easy reading.

  But even when individual problems of style and technique have been resolved, the poems’ interest is seldom exhausted. First, Browning often chooses an unexpected point of view, especially in his monologues, thus forcing the reader to accept an unfamiliar perspective. Second, he is capable of startling changes of focus within a poem. For example, he chooses subjects in themselves insignificant, as in “Fra Lippo Lippi” and “Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha,” and treats through them the eternal themes of poetry. This transition from particular observation to transcendental truth presents much the same challenge to the reader as do the metaphysical poets of the 17th century and much the same excitement. Third, because Browning seldom presents a speaker without irony, there is a constant demand on the reader to appreciate exactly the direction of satiric force in the poem. Even in a melodious poem such as “A Toccata of Galuppi’s,” the valid position must be distinguished from the false at every turn of the argument, while in the major casuistic monologues, such as “Bishop Blougram’s Apology,” the shifts of sympathy are subtler still.

It has also been objected that Browning uses his poetry as a vehicle for his philosophy, which is not of itself profound or interesting, being limited to an easy optimism. But Browning’s dramatic monologues must, as he himself insisted, be recognized as the utterances of fictitious persons drawing their strength from their appropriateness in characterizing the speaker, and not as expressions of Browning’s own sentiments. Thus his great gallery of imagined characters is to be regarded as an exhaustive catalog of human motives, not as a series of self-portraits. Nevertheless, certain fundamental assumptions are made so regularly that they may be taken to represent Browning’s personal beliefs, such as his Christian faith. In matters of human conduct his sympathies are with those who show loving hearts, honest natures, and warmth of feeling; certainly these qualities are never satirized. He is in general on the side of those who commit themselves wholeheartedly to an ideal, even if they fail.


Robert Browning circa 1888
  By itself this might suggest rather a naive system of values, yet he also, sometimes even in the same poem, shows his understanding of those who have been forced to lower their standards and accept a compromise. Thus, although Browning is far from taking a cynical or pessimistic view of man’s nature or destiny, his hopes for the world are not simple and unreasoning.

In The Ring and the Book Browning displays all his distinctive qualities. He allows a dramatic monologue to each character he portrays—to the man on trial for murder, to his young wife, whom he has mortally wounded, to her protector, to various Roman citizens, to the opposing lawyers, and to the pope, who ultimately decides the accused’s fate. Each monologue deals with substantially the same occurrences, but each, of course, describes and interprets them differently.

By permitting the true facts to emerge gradually by inference from these conflicting accounts, Browning reveals with increasing subtlety the true natures of his characters. As each great monologue illuminates the moral being of the speaker, it becomes clear that nothing less than the whole ethical basis of human actions is in question.

For over 20,000 lines Browning explores his theme, employing an unfaltering blank verse, rising often to passages of moving poetry, realizing in extraordinary detail the life of 17th-century Rome, and creating a series of characters as diverse and fully realized as those in any novel.

During Browning’s lifetime, critical recognition came rapidly after 1864; and, although his books never sold as well as his wife’s or Tennyson’s, he thereafter acquired a considerable and enthusiastic public. In the 20th century his reputation, along with those of the other great Victorians, declined, and his work did not enjoy a wide reading public, perhaps in part because of increasing skepticism of the values implied in his poetry. He has, however, influenced many modern poets, such as Robert Frost and Ezra Pound, partly through his development of the dramatic monologue, with its emphasis on the psychology of the individual and his stream of consciousness, but even more through his success in writing about the variety of modern life in language that owed nothing to convention. As long as technical accomplishment, richness of texture, sustained imaginative power, and a warm interest in humanity are counted virtues, Browning will be numbered among the great English poets.

Philip Drew

Encyclopædia Britannica
  Robert Browning 

"Dramatic Romances"

"The Pied Piper of Hamelin"
  Western Literature

English Literature - German literature
French literature - Russian literature
American literature
The Brothers Grimm: "Fairy Tales"

Children's and Household Tales (German: Kinder- und Hausmärchen) is a collection of German fairy tales first published in 1812 by the Brothers Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm. The collection is commonly known in the Anglosphere as Grimm's Fairy Tales (German: Grimms Elfenmärchen).

The first volume of the first edition was published in 1812, containing 86 stories; the second volume of 70 stories followed in 1815. For the second edition, two volumes were issued in 1819 and a third in 1822, totalling 170 tales. The third edition appeared in 1837; fourth edition, 1840; fifth edition, 1843; sixth edition, 1850; seventh edition, 1857. Stories were added, and also subtracted, from one edition to the next, until the seventh held 211 tales. All editions were extensively illustrated, first by Philipp Grot Johann and, after his death in 1892, by German illustrator Robert Leinweber.

The first volumes were much criticized because, although they were called "Children's Tales", they were not regarded as suitable for children, both for the scholarly information included and the subject matter. Many changes through the editions – such as turning the wicked mother of the first edition in Snow White and Hansel and Gretel (shown in original Grimm stories as Hänsel and Grethel) to a stepmother, were probably made with an eye to such suitability.

They removed sexual references—such as Rapunzel's innocently asking why her dress was getting tight around her belly, and thus naïvely revealing her pregnancy and the prince's visits to her stepmother—but, in many respects, violence, particularly when punishing villains, was increased.

In 1825 the Brothers published their Kleine Ausgabe or "small edition", a selection of 50 tales designed for child readers. This children's version went through ten editions between 1825 and 1858.

Title page of first volume of Grimms' Kinder- und Hausmärchen
The influence of these books was widespread. W. H. Auden praised the collection, during World War II, as one of the founding works of Western culture. The tales themselves have been put to many uses. Hitler praised them as folkish tales showing children with sound racial instincts seeking racially pure marriage partners, and so strongly that the Allied forces warned against them; for instance, Cinderella with the heroine as racially pure, the stepmother as an alien, and the prince with an unspoiled instinct being able to distinguish. Writers who have written about the Holocaust have combined the tales with their memoirs, as Jane Yolen in her Briar Rose.

The work of the Brothers Grimm influenced other collectors, both inspiring them to collect tales and leading them to similarly believe, in a spirit of romantic nationalism, that the fairy tales of a country were particularly representative of it, to the neglect of cross-cultural influence. Among those influenced were the Russian Alexander Afanasyev, the Norwegians Peter Christen Asbjørnsen and Jørgen Moe, the English Joseph Jacobs, and Jeremiah Curtin, an American who collected Irish tales. There was not always a pleased reaction to their collection. Joseph Jacobs was in part inspired by his complaint that English children did not read English fairy tales; in his own words, "What Perrault began, the Grimms completed".

Three individual works of Wilhelm Grimm include Altdänische Heldenlieder, Balladen und Märchen ('Old Danish Heroic Songs, Ballads, and Folktales') in 1811, Über deutsche Runen ('On German Runes') in 1821, and Die deutsche Heldensage ('The German Heroic Saga') in 1829.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Wilhelm and Jakob Grimm

"Grimms Fairy Tales"
  Western Literature

English Literature - German literature
French literature - Russian literature
American literature
Lord Byron: "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage"

Childe Harold's Pilgrimage is a lengthy narrative poem in four parts written by Lord Byron (Byron George Gordon). It was published between 1812 and 1818 and is dedicated to "Ianthe". The poem describes the travels and reflections of a world-weary young man who, disillusioned with a life of pleasure and revelry, looks for distraction in foreign lands. In a wider sense, it is an expression of the melancholy and disillusionment felt by a generation weary of the wars of the post-Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. The title comes from the term childe, a medieval title for a young man who was a candidate for knighthood.

The poem contains elements thought to be autobiographical, as Byron generated some of the storyline from experience gained during his travels through Portugal, the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea between 1809 and 1811. The "Ianthe" of the dedication was the term of endearment he used for Lady Charlotte Harley. Charlotte Bacon née Harley was the second daughter of 5th Earl of Oxford and Lady Oxford Jane Elizabeth Scott née Harley, about 11 years old when Childe Harold was first published. Throughout the poem Byron, in character of Childe Harold, regretted his wasted early youth, hence re-evaluating his life choices and re-designing himself through going on the pilgrimage, during which he lamented on various historical events including the Iberian Peninsular War among others.
Despite Byron's initial hesitation at having the first two cantos of the poem published because he felt it revealed too much of himself, it was published, at the urging of friends, by John Murray in 1812, and brought both the poem and its author to immediate and unexpected public attention. Byron later wrote, "I awoke one morning and found myself famous". The first two cantos in John Murray's edition were illustrated by Richard Westall, well known painter and illustrator who was then commissioned to paint portraits of Byron.

Byronic hero
The work provided the first example of the Byronic hero. The idea of the Byronic hero is one that consists of many different characteristics. The hero must have a rather high level of intelligence and perception as well as be able to easily adapt to new situations and use cunning to his own gain. It is clear from this description that this hero is well-educated and by extension is rather sophisticated in his style. Aside from the obvious charm and attractiveness that this automatically creates, he struggles with his integrity, being prone to mood swings.

Frontispiece to a c. 1825 edition of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage
Generally, the hero has a disrespect for certain figures of authority, thus creating the image of the Byronic hero as an exile or an outcast. The hero also has a tendency to be arrogant and cynical, indulging in self-destructive behaviour which leads to the need to seduce women. Although his sexual attraction through being mysterious is rather helpful, it often gets the hero into trouble. Characters with the qualities of the Byronic hero have appeared in novels, films and plays ever since.

The poem has four cantos written in Spenserian stanzas, which consist of eight iambic pentameter lines followed by one alexandrine (a twelve syllable iambic line), and has rhyme pattern ABABBCBCC.


Childe Harold's Pilgrimage by Joseph Mallord William Turner, 1823.
Childe Harold became a vehicle for Byron's own beliefs and ideas; indeed in the preface to canto four Byron acknowledges that there is little or no difference between author and protagonist. According to Jerome McGann, by masking himself behind a literary artifice, Byron was able to express his view that "man's greatest tragedy is that he can conceive of a perfection which he cannot attain".

Cultural references
Parts of it have been quoted towards the end of Asterix in Belgium and the 2000 film Britannic.

Hector Berlioz drew inspiration from this poem in the creation of his second symphony, a programmatic and arguably semi-autobiographical work called Harold en Italie.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

George Gordon, Lord Byron 

"Don Juan"
  Western Literature

English Literature - German literature
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Dickens Charles

Charles John Huffam Dickens (7 February 1812 – 9 June 1870) was an English writer and social critic. He created some of the world's most well-known fictional characters and is generally regarded as the greatest novelist of the Victorian period. During his life, his works enjoyed unprecedented popularity, and by the twentieth century he was widely seen as a literary genius by critics and scholars. His novels and short stories continue to be widely popular.


Dickens in New York, 1867
  Born in Portsmouth, England, Dickens was forced to leave school to work in a factory when his father was thrown into debtors' prison. Although he had little formal education, his early impoverishment drove him to succeed.

Over his career he edited a weekly journal for 20 years, wrote 15 novels, five novellas and hundreds of short stories and non-fiction articles, lectured and performed extensively, was an indefatigable letter writer, and campaigned vigorously for children's rights, education, and other social reforms.

Dickens sprang to fame with the 1836 serial publication of The Pickwick Papers. Within a few years he had become an international literary celebrity, famous for his humour, satire, and keen observation of character and society. His novels, most published in monthly or weekly instalments, pioneered the serial publication of narrative fiction, which became the dominant Victorian mode for novel publication.

The instalment format allowed Dickens to evaluate his audience's reaction, and he often modified his plot and character development based on such feedback. For example, when his wife's chiropodist expressed distress at the way Miss Mowcher in David Copperfield seemed to reflect her disabilities, Dickens went on to improve the character with positive features.

His plots were carefully constructed, and Dickens often wove in elements from topical events into his narratives. Masses of the illiterate poor chipped in ha'pennies to have each new monthly episode read to them, opening up and inspiring a new class of readers.

Dickens was regarded as the literary colossus of his age. His 1843 novella, A Christmas Carol, is one of the most influential works ever written, and it remains popular and continues to inspire adaptations in every artistic genre. Set in London and Paris, his 1859 novel, A Tale of Two Cities, is the best selling novel of all time. His creative genius has been praised by fellow writers—from Leo Tolstoy to George Orwell and G. K. Chesterton—for its realism, comedy, prose style, unique characterisations, and social criticism. On the other hand Oscar Wilde, Henry James and Virginia Woolf complained of a lack of psychological depth, loose writing, and a vein of saccharine sentimentalism. The term Dickensian is used to describe something that is reminiscent of Dickens and his writings, such as poor social conditions or comically repulsive characters.

Dickens' Dream by Robert William Buss, portraying Dickens at his desk at
Gads Hill Place surrounded by many of his characters
  Charles Dickens

"Great Expectations"
  Western Literature

English Literature - German literature
French literature - Russian literature
American literature
Present Drury Lane Theatre, London, erected
Theatre Royal Drury Lane

Drury Lane Theatre, in full Theatre Royal Drury Lane, oldest London theatre still in use. It stands in the eastern part of the City of Westminster.


The interior of the third and largest theatre to stand at Drury Lane, c. 1808
The first theatre was built by the dramatist Thomas Killigrew for his company of actors as the Theatre Royal under a charter from Charles II. It opened May 7, 1663, in the propitious era of Restoration drama, and produced plays by John Dryden, among others. It was closed in 1665–66 but then prospered until being destroyed by fire (1672). Rebuilt on its present site in Drury Lane in 1674 with Sir Christopher Wren as its probable architect, the second Theatre Royal soon featured the works of William Congreve.

Drury Lane enjoyed one of its finest periods (1710/11–33) under the control of the famous triumvirate made up of the actor-playwright Colley Cibber, the comedian Robert Wilks, the character actor Thomas Doggett (until 1713), and (from 1713) the actor Barton Booth. It then fell into the hands of a spendthrift, Charles Fleetwood, whose mismanagement almost brought the theatre to ruin, despite such triumphs as Charles Macklin’s revolutionary portrayal of Shylock as a tragic rather than comic character. It was rescued in 1747 when David Garrick took over and opened with a brilliant new troupe, a more natural style of acting and production, and superior Shakespearean texts. Garrick upheld these high standards for the next 30 years. He was succeeded by Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Under his management (1776–88) The School for Scandal held the stage, and the performances of Sarah Siddons as Lady Macbeth and John Philip Kemble as Hamlet were given. The second theatre was demolished in 1791.

  When a new “fireproof” theatre, built in 1791–94 to the designs of Henry Holland, burned down in 1809, another was designed by Benjamin Wyatt and opened in 1812.

In this era the actor Edmund Kean attracted large audiences. After his decline Drury Lane went into a long period of progressive deterioration until it was taken over by Augustus Harris in 1879. In the 1880s and ’90s it again prospered as the home of grand melodramas and of pantomimes staged by Harris.

His successor, Arthur Collins, profited from the production of a similar repertoire. In the 1900s it was the scene of notable performances by Sir Henry Irving, Ellen Terry, and Sir Johnston Forbes-Robertson. The conductor Sir Thomas Beecham’s great opera seasons were held there.

Beginning in the mid-1920s, the theatre also featured musicals. During World War II it was the headquarters of ENSA (Entertainments National Service Association).

On May 7, 1963, the Drury Lane celebrated its tercentenary. Notable presentations in the late 20th century included Mame (1969); The Pirates of Penzance (1982); and Miss Saigon, which opened there in 1989 and continued through the late 1990s.

Encyclopædia Britannica

Goncharov Ivan Aleksandrovich

Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov, (born June 18 [June 6, old style], 1812, Simbirsk, Russia—died Sept. 27 [Sept. 15, O.S.], 1891, St. Petersburg), Russian novelist and travel writer, whose highly esteemed novels dramatize social change in Russia and contain some of Russian literature’s most vivid and memorable characters.


Portrait of Ivan Goncharov by Ivan Kramskoi (1874)
  Goncharov was born into a wealthy merchant family and, after graduating from Moscow University in 1834, served for nearly 30 years as an official, first in the Ministry of Finance and afterward in the Ministry of Censorship.

The only unusual event in his uneventful life was his voyage to Japan made in 1852–55 as secretary to a Russian admiral; this was described in Fregat Pallada (1858; “The Frigate Pallas”).

Goncharov’s most notable achievement lies in his three novels, of which the first was Obyknovennaya istoriya (1847; A Common Story, 1917), a novel that immediately made his reputation when it was acclaimed by the influential critic Vissarion Belinsky. Oblomov (1859; Eng. trans., 1954), a more mature work, generally accepted as one of the most important Russian novels, draws a powerful contrast between the aristocratic and capitalistic classes in Russia and attacks the way of life based on serfdom. Its hero, Oblomov, a generous but indecisive young nobleman who loses the woman he loves to a vigorous, pragmatic friend, is a triumph of characterization.

From this character derives the Russian term oblomovshchina, epitomizing the backwardness, inertia, and futility of 19th-century Russian society. Goncharov’s third novel, Obryv (1869; The Precipice, 1915), though a remarkable book, is inferior to Oblomov.

In all three novels Goncharov contrasts an easygoing dreamer with an opposing character who typifies businesslike efficiency; the contrast illumines social conditions in Russia at a time when rising capitalism and industrialization uneasily coexisted with the aristocratic traditions of old Russia.

Of Goncharov’s minor writings, the most influential was an essay on Aleksandr Griboyedov’s play Gore ot uma (Wit Works Woe).

Encyclopædia Britannica

Portrait of Goncharov by Ivan Kramskoi, 1865
see also: Ivan Goncharov
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Smiles Samuel

Samuel Smiles, (born Dec. 23, 1812, Haddington, Berwickshire, Scot.—died April 16, 1904, London), Scottish author best known for his didactic work Self-Help (1859), which, with its successors, Character (1871), Thrift (1875), and Duty (1880), enshrined the basic Victorian values associated with the “gospel of work.”


Samuel Smiles by Sir George Reid
  One of 11 children left fatherless in 1832, Smiles learned the meaning of self-reliance. Although he qualified in medicine at Edinburgh in 1832, he soon abandoned medical practice for journalism, moving to Leeds, where from 1838 to 1842 he edited the progressive and reformist Leeds Times. His radicalism was a practical application of the doctrines of the utilitarian philosophers (“philosophical radicals”) Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.

He was a zealous advocate of material progress based on individual enterprise and free trade. From 1845 to 1866 he was engaged in railway administration, and in 1857 he published a life of the inventor and founder of the railways, George Stephenson.
He followed this with Self-Help, with Illustrations of Character and Conduct, the outcome of a series of lectures on self-improvement given to young men in Leeds; 250,000 copies had been sold by the end of the century, and it was widely translated. Smiles wrote many other books, including Lives of the Engineers (3 vol., 1861–62; 5 vol., enlarged ed., 1874), a pioneer study in economic history; and an Autobiography (ed. by T. Mackay, 1905).

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Krasinski Zygmunt
Count Napoleon Stanisław Adam Ludwig Zygmunt Krasiński (19 February 1812 – 23 February 1859), a Polish nobleman traditionally ranked with Mickiewicz and Słowacki as one of Poland's Three National Bards — the trio of great Romantic poets who influenced national consciousness during the period of Poland's political bondage. He was the most famous member of the aristocratic Krasiński family.

Zygmunt Krasinski
  Life and work
Krasiński was born and died in Paris, France. He was the son of a general, Count Wincenty Krasiński, of the aristocratic Krasiński family. He studied law at Warsaw University and in Geneva in 1829, where he met Adam Mickiewicz. His letters indicate that he suffered morally over the November Uprising of 1831, and he gave himself in to Tsar Nicholas's Court in ill health. He was released and went to Vienna.

Krasiński was more socio-politically conservative than the other two poets. He published much of his work anonymously.

He is best known for his philosophical Messianist ideas and tragic dramas. Krasiński's writings from the 1830s are full of frenetic plots, strongly influenced by gothic fiction and Dante Alighieri. As the poet's most famous works show, he is most interested in the extreme face of human existence such as hate, desperation or solitude. His drama, Nie-boska Komedia (The Un-Divine Comedy, 1833), portrays the tragedy of an old-world aristocracy defeated by a new order of communism and democracy, and is a poetic prophecy of class conflict and of Russia's October Revolution (see also Okopy Świętej Trójcy). The work was paraphrased and expanded by Edward Robert, Lord Lytton, as "Orval, the Fool of Time" (1869). Krasiński's Agaj-Han (1834) is also well known in Poland.

It is a historical-poetic novel, though unlike the historical novels which were popular in Poland, such as those of Walter Scott. Agaj-Han is filled by macabre motives, death and fratricide. Upon human life still exists tragic fate. His drama, Irydion (1836), deals, in the context of Christian ethics, with the struggle of a subjugated nation against its oppressor.

His muse for many years was Countess Delfina Potocka (likewise a friend of Frédéric Chopin), with whom he conducted a romance from 1838 to 1846. Later she continued to be his friend, and he wrote for her Sen Cezary (published 1840) and Przedświt (Dawn's Approach, published 1843). Przedświt is his best known poem, a nationalist poem, which sees the partition of Poland as a sacrifice for sins and which predicts that Poland will later emerge as a world leader. Chopin set a poem by Krasiński as a song (see Polish songs by Frédéric Chopin).


Krasiński's wife and children
On 26 July 1843, Krasiński married Polish Countess Eliza Branicka (1820–76). Later (1844–1848) he wrote Psalmy Przyszłości (Psalms of the Future), in which Krasiński calls to love and charity according to Christianity.

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Kraszewski Joseph Ignatius

Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (28 July 1812 – 19 March 1887) was a Polish writer, historian and journalist who produced more than 200 novels and 150 novellas, short stories, and art reviews (including reviews of painters, e.g., Michał Kulesza). He is best known for his epic series on the history of Poland, comprising twenty-nine novels in seventy-nine parts.


Józef Ignacy Kraszewski
  As a novelist writing about Polish history, Kraszewski is generally regarded as second only to Henryk Sienkiewicz.


Kraszewski was born in Warsaw and brought up in Romanów, Gmina Sosnówka, by his grandmother.

He attended schools in Biała Podlaska (1822–26), Lublin (1826–27) and Świsłocz (1827–29).

After 1829 he studied medicine and literature.

From 1859 he was an editor at Gazeta Warszawska (The Warsaw Gazette) and in 1870 an editor at Tydzień (The Week).

In 1883 he was arrested in Berlin, charged with collaborating with French military intelligence, and sentenced to three and a half years of imprisonment at Magdeburg Fortress.

He died at Geneva in 1886.

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